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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the effect of specific and general 
price changes on a firm's systematic risk. To capture this effect, a 
theoretical model based on capital asset pricing theory is developed. 
In the development of this theoretical model, it is shown that specific 
and general price changes can affect a firm's risk. Thus, disclosure 
of this information could be useful for risk assessment. It is further 
shown that even when there are no general price changes, disclosure of 
specific price information can be useful. 
Three empirical tests are performed to test the theoretical model. 
The first and second tests address the usefulness of mandated inflation 
accounting disclosures. The third test examines systematic risk changes 
in periods characterized by different inflation rates. Results of the 
empirical tests indicate that mandated inflation accounting disclosures 
do not appear to significantly affect investors' risk assessments. 
Also, the number of risk changes in the three different inflation 
periods is not significantly different. 
These results do not imply that mandated inflation accounting 
disclosures are not needed, or that inflation has no effect on risk. 
However, they may suggest that data currently being disclosed is not 
adequate or sufficient. In any case, by first developing a theoretical 
model and then empirically testing this model, the merits of disclosure 
of specific and general price information can be assessed more 
accurately. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement 
No. 33 (FAS33) in September, 1979, requiring public enterprises meeting 
certain size requirements to disclosed supplementary, inflation-adjusted 
information.' This standard replaced Accounting Series Release 190 
(ASR190), which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted 
in 1976 requiring disclosure of replacement cost data in corporate 10-K 
reports. ASR190 did not require the restatement of earnings or the 
disclosure of data adjusted for general price level changes. 
Consequently, ASR190 was subjected to a considerable amount of criticism, 
and the SEC indicated to the FASB that is would be withdrawn if the 
Board would issue a suitable statement, which resulted in FAS33. 
By requiring the disclosure of inflation-adjusted numbers, the 
FASB hoped to supply users with information to more accurately assess 
the amount, timing, and uncertainty of prospective cash flows in 
accordance with the objectives of financial reporting (FASB, 1978). 
The FASB was optimistic that, at the individual firm level, creditors 
and investors (as well as other users) would be more informed for the 
p~rpose of assessing (1) future cash flows, (2) enterprise performance, 
(3) erosion of operating capability, and (4) erosion of general 
purchasing power. From a macroeconomic viewpoint, an inflation 
adjusted cost of capital would lead to a more efficient allocation of 
1 
resources, and governmental policymakers would have more relevant 
information on which to base economic policy. 
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Several studies have been performed to determine whether the 
objectives of ASR190 and FAS33 have been met. A variety of methodologies 
have been employed, including tests of capital market reaction to the 
disclosures and tests of the predictive ability of systematic risk 
using inflation-adjusted accounting data. This dissertation is related 
to studies performed in these two specific areas. 
Before discussing the studies in these areas and comparing them to 
the work performed in this study; however, a background of mandated 
inflation accounting disclosures is presented. Therefore, the first 
section of this chapter discusses the background and content of ASR190 
and FAS33. The second section then describes the previous studies in 
these two areas that tested for usefulness of inflation disclosures. 
The third section includes a statement of the problem addressed in 
this study, while the last section contains a summary of the content 
of this study. 
Background--ASR190 and FAS33 
The issue of requiring inflation disclosures became a topic of 
major concern in 1973 because of the first oil crisis and double-digit 
inflation. Early in 1974, the FASB issued a discussion memorandum 
calling for the presentation of supplemental, general price level-
adjusted statements. The SEC, however, desired disclosure of supple-
mentary information with respect to specific price changes, not general 
price changes. The FASB argued that presenting both sets of information 
would be too burdensome for businesses. In August of 1975, the SEC 
proposed requiring replacement cost data, and the FASB postponed making 
an inflation decision. The result of the SEC's proposal was ASR190, 
which required that supplemental replacement cost information on 
inventory, cost of goods sold, property, plant, and equipment, and 
depreciation be included in corporate 10-K reports. This rule applied 
to all firms with (1) total inventory and gross property, plant, and 
equipment in excess of $100 million, and (2) total inventory and gross 
property, plant, and equipment representing more than 10 percent of 
total assets. ASR190 did not require the restatement of earnings, 
which the FASB felt users of information really needed and wanted. 
ASR190 was soon subjected to a considerable amount of criticism, 
and the SEC indicated to the FASB that it would be withdrawn if the 
Board would issue a suitable statement. In December of 1978, the FASB 
issued a new Exposure Draft giving management the option to choose 
between constant-dollar (general price change) or current cost (specific 
price change) accounting (FASB, 1978). Eventually, FAS33 was issued in 
September, 1979, requiring both of the restatements for companies that 
had either: 
1. Inventory and net property plant and equipment of at least 
$125 million, or 
2. Total assets over $1 billion. 
The dual-disclosure approach was selected because of the diversity 
of opinion expressed by the respondents to the Exposure Draft. The 
required general price change data was: 
1. Information on income from continuing operations for the 
current fiscal year on a historical cost/constant dollar basis, and 
2. The purchasing power gain or loss on net monetary items for 
the current fiscal year. 
3 
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The required specific price change data was: 
1. Information on income from continuing operations for the current 
fiscal year on a current cost basis, 
2. The current cost amounts of inventory, property, plant, and 
equipment at the end of the current fiscal year, and 
3. Increases or decreases for the current fiscal year in the 
current cost amounts of inventory and property, plant, and equipment, 
net of changes in the general price level. 
The FASB stated that it intended to assess the usefulness of both 
types of information and to undertake a comprehensive review no later 
than five years after its implementation. This comprehensive review is 
still pending; however, the FASB recently eliminated the requirement 
for disclosure of historical cost/constant dollar information for those 
enterprises that present current cost/constant dollar information (FASB, 
1984). In announcing this elimination, the FASB stated that a proposed 
statement is currently in process that will address current cost/ 
constant purchasing power disclosures and will combine all pronouncements 
related to FAS33. 
Prior Research 
In its Invitation to Comment on the Need for Research (1981), the 
FASB encouraged additional research to determine if its objectives 
were being met. A sample list of research questions was included as 
part of this Invitation to Comment, two of which included, 
1. Are there any immediate effects on stock prices or trading 
volume at the time of disclosures? 
2. Do the disclosures affect analysts' estimates of future cash 
flows or assessments of risk (emphasis added)? 
Several studies have attempted to answer these questions by 
relying on capital market theory (Sharpe, 1963) and the related capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Linter (1965), 
and Mossin (1966). This theory provides a framework from which it is 
possible to draw implications concerning the role of accounting infor-
mation in an efficient market. A brief review of this theory is 
warranted. 
All investors are assumed to be risk averse and desire to maximize 
expected utility. Under uncertainty, each investor is faced with a set 
of probability distributions on market values of firms at the beginning 
of the period. Each probability distribution is characterized by two 
parameters, the mean and standard deviation, and it is assumed that 
investors can summarize their investment opportunities in terms of 
these parameters. The mean is viewed as a measure of the expected 
requrn of the investment, while the standard deviation is regarded as 
the measure of the riskiness of the investment. Hence, investment 
analysis is reduced to assessing the risk-return characteristics of 
return distributions that exist at the beginning of the period. 
The related CAPM, discussed in more detail in Chapter II, yields 
a picture of market equilibrium that implies a relationship between a 
measure of risk for the individual assets and their expected return. 
Within the context of this model, the only variable that determines the 
differential riskiness among securities is the systematic risk, and 
therefore the role of accounting information focuses on systematic risk. 
Beaver (1972) states this explicitly: 
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Moreover, in an efficient market, the only potential value 
of accounting information to the individual investor would 
be the assessment of the risk (and hence, expected return) 
associated with a given portfolio, which in turn would 
involve estimation of the systematic risk component for 
the individual securities that constitute the portfolio 
(p. 423) 0 
Thus, one role of accounting information would be to improve predictions 
of risk and expected return. 
Past empirical studies addressing the above-mentioned questions 
asked by the FASB have relied on estimates of systematic risk to test 
for the usefulness of inflation disclosures. Sharpe's (1963) market 
model has been used to estimate the statmetic risk component (beta) of 
an individual security return relative to the market return. 1 These 
studies can be broadly classified into two categories. The first 
category contains studies which tested for the information content 
of accounting disclosures by looking at security-returns behavior. The 
analysis of returns behavior, however, hinged on estimates of beta as 
derived from-the market model. If "abnormal" returns were generated 
when the information was disclosed, then this was considered to be 
evidence that accounting information had an impact on the market. 
Similar studies correlated various accounting measures with security 
returns. 
The second category contains studies which used beta as the 
dependent variable in a regression on several accounting risk measures 
(ARMs). If these ARMs could be used to form superior risk forecasts 
(as compared to the naive forecast model or technically-based forecast 
1This model is described in detail in Chapter II. 
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models), then it is argued that this leads to an improvement in decision 
making at the individual leve1. 2 
Information Content Studies 
Many studies were performed testing for market reaction to ASR190 
after it was promulgated in 1976. Tests included ASR190's initial 
proposal, its effective date, and the dates when the actual replacement 
cost information was filed with the SEC. These studies included Abdel-
khalik and McKeown (1978), Beaver, Christie, and Griffin (1980), Gheyara 
and Boatsman (1980), and Ro (1980, 1981). They were unanimous in their 
failure to detect a price or volume reaction to the SEC regulation 
mandating the disclosure of replacement cost data. Although all the 
studies used basically the same set of data, the finding of no market 
reaction is strengthened by the fact that the studies used different 
methodological approaches. 
7 
Beaver, Griffin, and Landsman (1981) used a cross-sectional approach 
to assess the incremental value of ASR190 data using the period 1972-1978. 
They found that a historical cost measure of income correlated more 
closely with security returns than an ASR190 measure of income 
(preholding gain net income). Moreover, once historical cost income 
is known, a replacement cost measure of net income provides no additional 
useful information. The reverse was found not to be true. Clearly, 
2Whereas this model assumes that the capital market is "efficient" 
at the aggregate level, it says nothing about information efficiency 
at the individual investor level. An investor can still earn an 
abnormal return, but not consistently over time. 
the results of this study are consistent with the results of the market 
reaction studies above. 
Because FASB33 has only been effective since 1979, few published 
studies have been able to use actual FAS33 data. However, this has 
8 
not prevented researchers from testing the reaction to FASB deliberations 
on FAS33. Noreen and Sepe (1981) investigated the impact on the market 
of three events: (1) the addition of general price-level disclosures 
to the FASB's agenda in January, 1974; (2) the November, 1975, decision 
not to issue a report by year-end; and (3) the report in January, 1979, 
to propose a standard (which culminated, of course, in FAS33). Firms 
were partitioned into those that would be "affected" and those that 
would be "exempt." If an affected firm experienced a positive price 
reaction when events (1) and (3) occurred, then a "price reversal" 
for event (2) might be expected. 
The results, based on correlations between events for affected 
firms, suggest there was a reaction. For 100 firms with the lowest 
prior-period variance of prices, the results were even more significant. 
These firms were chosen since they were the ones least likely to have 
a market reaction anyway. 
A study by Beaver and Landsman (1984) used a two-stage regression 
to test for relationships between accounting data and security returns. 
Using actual FAS33 earnings data and historical cost earnings data, 
they found that historical cost was the only predominant variable 
explaining security returns. In other words, FAS33 disclosures had no 
incremental information content. 
Another similar unpublished study by Elgers, Hogan, Mannino, and 
Murray (1983) used actual FAS33 data to test the degree of association 
between unexpected earnings (as computed using nominal dollars, constant 
dollars, and current dollars) and abnormal security returns. Their 
results indicated that after controlling for the information content of 
historical cost information, additional inflation disclosures do not 
substantially contribute toward explaining interfirm differences in 
security returns. 
Systematic Risk Prediction Studies 
ASR190's adoption resulted in several empirical studies testing 
for associations between inflation-adjusted ARMs and beta. Basu (1977) 
and Short (1978) used historical cost (HC) and general price level (GPL) 
ARMs as explanatory variables for beta. The results were conflicting. 
Basu concluded that HC and GPL ARMs are interchangeable, while Short 
found that GPL ARM's had a 34 percent increase in explanatory power. 
Baran, Lakonishok, and Ofer (1980) estimated GPL data using validated 
techniques and found that, over an 18 year period (1957-1974), GPL 
accounting beta had a higher association with the market beta than did 
HC accounting beta. This was true for three different definitions of 
earnings. The authors also analyzed two subperiods, noting no 
significant difference for the subperiod 1957-1965, while GPL data were 
superior for 1966-1974. They explained that this may have been due to 
a learning effect during the second, more inflationary subperiod. 
The previously cited unpublished study by Elgers et al. (1983) 
also contained a test using several ARMs measured in nominal, constant, 
and current dollars. They found that a combined information set had 
the highest explanatory power. Interestingly, though, nothing was done 
to "correct" for betas mean regression tendencies or to allow for 
unstable ARMs. 
9 
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Criticisms and Limitations , 
A wide variety of methodological approaches have been used in both 
of the above types of studies. When taken together, the conclusions 
reached provide little evidence of market reaction to price change 
disclosures, and conflicting evidence on predictability value of these 
disclosures. One reason for this, perhaps, is that none of the studies 
incorporated price changes into the theory on which the tests were 
based. If inflation or inflation disclosures has an effect on systematic 
risk, then the results of these studies may be erroneous. For example, 
if the returns calculated in information content studies were based on 
a parameter that was by itself affected by inflation (or inflation 
disclosure), then it may not have been possible to identify an "abnormal" 
return caused by the disclosure. 
By the same token, the dependent variable (beta) used in the 
systematic risk prediction studies may have been affected by general 
and specific price changes. Moreover, most of the independent variables 
(ARMs) used in the studies were not theoretically linked to systematic 
. k 3 
r1s • Without a theory explaining which ARMs (whether historical or 
inflation-adjusted) to include in the tests, the differences in 
explanatory power between historical models and price level adjusted 
models could be due to a misspecification of the model. 
3While past analytical studies (Hamada, 1969, 1972; and Conine, 
1980) have identified financial leverage as a determinant of risk, 
other variables identified as being theoretically linked to beta have 
not been put to empirical test. The reason for this is that these 
variables (e.g., ratio of fixed costs to variable costs, covariability 
of firm output level to market return) are extremely difficult to 
operationalize. 
Lev and Ohlson (1983) commented on the need for such a theory: 
The 'positive' work has generally been disappointing, and 
there have been few, if any, serious 'normative' studies. 
Much of the 'positive' work is best described as 'fishing 
expeditions.' Consideration is seldom given to what 
determines systematic risk and why there ought to be a 
change in risk because the accounting and economic 
environments have changed (p. 65). 
In addition to the lack of a theoretical foundation, a limitation 
common to all the studies reviewed in this section is that they either 
analyzed only a small amount of data or, in the case of studies such 
as Basu (1977), Short (1978), and Baran et al. (1980), had to estimate 
general price-level data using estimation techniques that were of 
. bl l"d" 4 quest~ona e va ~ ~ty. As more years of FAS33 data become available, 
tests based on time-series information are possible. 
Statement of the Problem 
Lev and Ohlson are but two of several researchers calling for the 
development of a theory linking systematic risk and accounting 
information. Revsine (1970), for example, was one of the first to 
recognize the need for such a theory in the replacement cost area: 
In summary, empirical evidence is an important component 
of the total research process. In the replacement cost 
area, however, there is no underlying theoretical base 
to guide empirical tests. Without this base, empirical 
tests are likely to be disjointed. Much effort would be 
4walther (1982) has shown that two of the most widely-used models 
for estimating general price level data contain a great deal of 
measurement error. He showed that estimated purchasing power gains and 
losses overstated actual amounts by 70.11 percent and estimated general 
price level adjusted depreciation expense exceeded actual by about 
14 percent for both the Davidson-Weil and Parker models. Cost of goods 
sold was very close to actual for both models. 
11 
wasted in attempting to discover what might later prove to 
be irrelevant data. In the long run, it would seem to be 
far more efficient if the needed theoretical foundation 
were developed first. Then, with this foundation to guide 
later testing of the theory, empirical progress would be 
expedited (p. 3). 
At present, an accurate assessment of the effects of inflation on 
an individual firm is unclear, if prices of specific goods and services 
change at a rate different than the general price change. As Beaver 
and Landsman (1984, p. 3) point out, "In a world where prices change at 
different rates, inflation is a subjective concept, and controversies 
arise as how best to measure it." Therefore, a theory which predicts 
the effects of price changes on future cash flows and riskiness of 
these flows would allow stronger implications to be drawn from 
empirical tests. 
12 
No theory currently exists which links the effects of price changes 
to systematic risk. The objective of this research is first to incor-
porate specific and general price changes into traditional capital 
market theory, and then to determine whether these variables affect 
systematic risk. If it can be shown that price change variables do 
affect systematic risk, then a logical question is whether ASR190 
and/or FAS33 disclosures enabled investors to obtain more accurate 
measures of these variables. This question is addressed in the first 
two empirical tests. The third empirical test examines the effects 
of general price changes on systematic risk. 
Summary of Content 
Chapter I introduced the problem of disclosing inflation-adjusted 
accounting information. Several capital market studies testing for 
the information value of these disclosures were discussed. It was 
13 
pointed out that one of the possible reasons these studies have not 
provided overwhelming evidence for or against ASR190 or FAS33 disclosures 
is that no theory currently exists which links the effects of price 
changes to systematic risk. By first developing a theoretical model 
incorporating price change variables, the effect of price changes on 
systematic risk can be assessed. Empirical tests can then be performed 
to see if the disclosures required by ASR190 and FAS33 contained 
information about these price change variables. If so, investors may 
have revised their systematic risk assessments based on this information. 
Chapter II presents the analytical development of the model, which 
explicitly incorporates specific and general price changes. Chapter III 
explains the design and methodology of the three empirical tests to be 
performed, while Chapter IV provides an analysis of the results. 
Chapter V concludes with a summary of the findings of the study, a 
discussion of its limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
CHAPTER II 
PRICE CHANGES AND BETA: AN ANALYTICAL EVALUATION 
The objective of this chapter is to explore analytically the 
effects of specific and general price changes on systematic risk. The 
first section presents a model linking beta to firm value in a non-
inflationary environment. This model, which is based on capital market 
theory, is then expanded in the second section to reflect price changes, 
and it is examined to determine whether these price change parameters 
affect beta. The third section illustrates several different cases of 
price changes by means of numerical examples. The first set of cases 
involves only specific price changes, while the second set is expanded 
to include both specific and general price changes. The fourth section 
discusses some implications of the model which are useful in providing 
a basis on which to empirically test the relationships between 
systematic risk and price changes. Finally, the last section summarizes 
the chapter. 
Review of the CAPM 
The theoretical examination of the linkages between beta and price 
changes is done using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed 
by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966). According to the 
CAPM, the equilibrium expected return is: 
14 
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cov(r. ' rmt)[rmt - i] 
i + ]t rjt = 
var(r ) 
mt 
i + s. r:r t - i] (1) J m 
where r. ]t the rate of return for period t on asset j, 
r 
mt = the rate of return for period t on the market portfolio, 
rjt = the expected value of r. ' ]t 
r = the expected 
mt value of r mt' 
i the riskless rate of return, and 
s. cov(r. ' r )/var(r ). 
J ]t mt mt 
The only firm-specific determinant of rjt is Sj' which is referred to as 
firm j's systematic risk, or beta. 
The rates of return are defined as: 
rjt 
yyjt+1 
vjt 
-
-
MMt+1 
r 
mt xt 
where: yyjt+1 
vjt 
MMt+1 
- 1 
- 1 
the end-of-period cash income plus end-of-period 
market value of asset j, 
the current equilibrium value of asset j, 
the end-of-period cash income plus end-of-period 
market value of the market portfolio, and 
(2) 
(3) 
xt = the current equilibrium value of the market portfolio. 
To simplify the analysis, equations (2) and (3) are redefined as: 
yjt+1 
vjt 
Mt+1 
=--
(2a) 
(3a) 
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where Yjt+1 = the end-of-period net cash income for asset j and 
Mt+1 the end-of-period net cash income of the market portfolio. 
Notice that end-of-period market value is not included in Yjt+1 or Mt+1 • 
Since end-of-period value is a deterministic component of YYjt+1 or MMt+1 ' 
excluding it in the definition of Yjt+1 or Mt+l will not affect the 
subsequent analysis (its inclusion would merely result in additional 
non-relevant terms). Exclusion of Vjt+1 and Xt+1 ' therefore, allows 
the effects of price changes to be more readily observed. 
Subsequent analysis is also facilitated using a cash-based version 
of the usual rate-of-return version described by equation (1). To 
achieve this cash-based version, equations (2a) and (3) are substituted 
into (1). Rearranging, we have: 
where A = 
- -
= Yjt+l - Acov(Yjt+1' Mt+1) 
Mt+l - iXt 
var(Mt+1) 
i 
The parameter A is the equilibrium price per unit of market risk. 
To make the following analysis less cumbersome, subscripts are omitted 
unless needed for clarity. 
The CAPM in an Inflationary Environment 
In order to incorporate general and specific price changes into 
the model, six assumptions in addition to the standard assumptions of 
the CAPM are made. This section will begin with a list of these 
assumptions, to be followed by (1) development of the model, 
(4) 
(5) 
(2) statement of the central proposition, and (3) presentation of three 
corollaries resulting from the central proposition. 
Additional Assumptions 
Assumption 1: Two inputs are used to produce the output. 
Assumption 2: Output price in a noninflationary environment 
equals input cost plus profit (where profit is a fixed percentage of 
inout cost). 
Assumption 3: r + g, that is the expected market rate of 
m 
return in the presence of inflation equals the expected market rate in 
1 the absence of inflation plus the inflation rage g (Fisher effect) . 
Assumption 4: i* = i + g, that is the risk-free rate of return in 
the presence of inflation equals the risk-free rate in the absence of 
inflation plus the inflation rate (Fisher effect). 
~ ~ 
Assumption 5: M* = (1 + g) M, where M* is the end-of-period cash 
flow on the market portfolio in an inflationary environment. 
Assumption 6: The firm experiences a specific rate of input price 
increases of k and passes along rate t to the consumer. 
e e 
The Effect of Price Changes on the CAPM 
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the end-of-period cash income in a 
noninflationary environment can be expressed as: 
1Assumption 3 insures that if a change in systematic risk is 
experienced by a firm due to disclosure of price-level data, then the 
systematic risk of the rest of the market adjusts so as to maintain 
general equilibrium. Specifically, this assumption guarantees that 
S = 1 is the market risk. 
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where c 
e 
cost of input e and 
TI = profit rate as a percentage of cost. 
In an inflationary environment, the end-of-period income, Y*, can 
be determined using Assumption 6. According to Assumption 6, if c is 
e 
the cost of input e, then t c is passed along to the consumer. If 
e e 
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(6) 
t = k , then all of the price increase is passed along to the consumer. 
e e 
It is also possible that t ~ k • This outcome is characterized as 
e e 
follows: 
LTIC + Lt c - Lk c 
e e e e e 
From equation (6), c = Y /n. Substituting this expression for c in 
e e e 
equation (7), and rearranging: 
where~ = [(n + t - k )/n]. 
e e e 
(7) 
(8) 
Clearly, ~ is a function of specific price information. Thus, if 
e 
it can be shown that ¢ is present in assessing systematic risk in an 
e 
inflationary environment, then this implies that specific prices 
influence systematic risk. Proposition 1 below addresses this issue. 
To facilitate analysis of this proposition, however, four lemmas must 
first be developed. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 analyze firm value in both noninflationary and 
inflationary environments. Lemmas 3 and 4 show the components of 
systematic risk in these environments. 
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Lemma 1: Firm value in a noninflationary environment can be 
expressed as: 
v = v1 + v2 
[Y - :\cov(Y , M)] 
where v e e i 1, 2 
e i 
Proof: Substitute equation (6) into equation (4) and rearrange. 
Lemma 2: Firm value in an inflationary environment is expressed as: 
V* cplVf + cp2V~ 
[Y - :\*cov(Y , M)] 
where V* e e i* 
M(r - i*) 
with :\* m 
r* var(:M) 
m 
Proof: Using Assumptions 3 and 5: 
r* r + g m m 
(l+g)M = 
X* r + g m 
X* = (1 + g)M 
r* 
m 
Furthermore, Assumption 5 also implies: 
var (H*) = (1 + g) 2 var (M) 
(9) 
(10) 
Using Assumption 4, and substituting equations (8), (9), and (10) into 
equation (4), the following outcome is produced: 
20 
M - -::::!-;-:M- ] 
- (1 + g) [-(1-+-g)-::2:--v m=ar_(_M_) cov(Y*, (1 + g)M) 
V* i* 
~1 + g)2 M- ;::] 
¢1'!1 + ¢2'!2 - cov(Y*, M) 2 -(1 + g) var(M) 
i* 
Mr* - i*M 
¢1Y1 + ¢2Y2 - m cov(Y*, M) 
r* var eM:) 
m 
i* (11) 
From equation (11), the desired results directly follow. Q.E.D. 
Since V* depends on ¢ and ¢ in turn depends on k , specific price 
e e e 
information is useful in assessing firm value. Similarly, V* is affected 
e 
by g, and so general price information is useful in assessing firm value. 
From Lernrna 1, the return of a two input firm can be expressed as: 
y1 + y2 
r 
v1 + v2 
y1 
+ 
y2 
v1 + v2 v1 + v2 
r1 + r2 (12) 
Given equation (12), the following lemma can now be stated: 
Lemma 3: The systematic risk of a firm in a noninflationary 
environment equals 
8 
where 8e 
81 + 82 
cov(r ' r ) 
e m 
var(r ) 
m 
21 
Proof: Follows directly from the substitution of equation (12) and 
the definition of 8 found in equation (1). 
Lemma 4: Firm return in an inflationary environment and firm 
return in a noninflationary environment are related in the following way: 
r* = a1r1 + ai2 
where 
<Pe (V 1 + V 2) 
i 1, 2 a = 
e V* 
Proof: From equation (8) and Lemma 2: 
From equation (12) it is possible to substitute re(V1 + v2) for Ye' 
yielding: 
r* 
¢1(V1 + V2)r1 + ¢2(V1 + V2)r2 
= V* 
¢1 (V1 + V2) 
r1 + 
<Pz(V1 + V2) 
= V* r2 V* 
Q.E.D. 
The Effect of Price Changes on 
Systematic Risk 
Given the analysis above, the central proposition can now be stated: 
Proposition 1: Specific and general price changes can affect a 
firm's systematic risk. Thus, price information has risk assessment 
value. 
Proof: From Lemma 4, r* 
Now, 
Let z 
Thus, 
and 
Accordingly: 
( ~ ~*) a 1 covr 1, rm 
~~--~7.-~~+ 
var(r ) 
m 
(1 + g)M 
(1 + g)M I (f*) 
m 
M 
r* m 
=- r 
r m 
m 
r* m 
=-=-r 
m 
zr 
m 
var(r*) 
( ~ r~*) a 2 cov r 2 , m 
var(r*) 
m 
(using equation (9) and 
Assumption 5) 
(since M r x) 
m 
Next, substitute equations (14) and (15) into (13), and simplify: 
22 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
or B* 
Since a is a function of ¢ and ¢ is a function of k , specific 
e e e e 
price changes affect B (by Lemma 3, B = B1 + S2). Moreover, z contains 
g, and therefore g affects B. Thus, both g and k are useful in 
e 
assessing the systematic risk of a firm in environment with price 
changes. Q.E.D. 
Two corollaries stemming from Proposition 1 can now be presented. 
Corollary 1: A sufficient condition for systematic risk to be 
unaffected by specific price changes is for the firm to pass the total 
specific price increases of each input to the consumer. 
Proof: B = B* if (a1/z) 
Since¢ = [(n + t 
e e 
achieve ¢ 1 = ¢2• Q.E.D. 
(a2/z). 
- k )/n], 
e 
setting t = k is one way to 
e e 
From this corollary, it is seen that a firm's systematic risk 
can be affected by its ability to transfer input price increases to 
the consumer. Firms that can more easily shift these price increases 
to the consumer will be less affected, in terms of systematic risk, 
than firms that cannot do so as readily. 
Corollary 2: If g = 0, specific price information is still useful 
in assessing a firm's systematic risk. 
V* 
e 
Proof: For g 
V . Thus, B* 
e 
0, z 1. Furthermore, for g = 0, Lemma 2 implies 
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Assessment of S* still requires knowledge of ~ 
e 
which is a function of k • Q.E.D. 
e 
The above corollary establishes the value of specific price 
information even when general price inflation is nonexistent. 
Accordingly, even though general inflation has declined from the levels 
being experienced when FAS33 was mandated, disclosure of specific price 
information can still be helpful in assessing systematic risk. 
The Effect of Price Changes on Systematic 
Risk: A Numerical Example 
In order to better illustrate the effects of specific and general 
price changes on systematric risk, a numerial example is presented. 
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Table I lists cash flow distributions for both a two-input firm (Firm A) 
and the market, along with related statistics computed for these 
distributions. Similarly, Table II lists the return distributions and 
related statistics. This data serves as the basis for examining the 
effect on beta, using several different price change scenarios. Before 
examining these price change scenarios, however, Table III presents 
similar information for Firm B. Notice that Firm A and Firm B make up 
the entire market. Also note that each firm's beta, weighted by its 
value in relation to the market, sums to one. 
Table IV describes seven cases involving specific price changes, 
while Table V provides a listing of the parameter values associated 
with each case. Finally, Table VI presents the parameter values for the 
same seven cases, except that general price changes are introduced. 
By first examining the effects of specific price changes in a particular 
case, and then introducing general price changes, it is possible to 
TABLE I 
CASH FLOW DISTRIBUTIONS: TWO-INPUT FIRM AND MARKET 
Firm A Cash Flow Distribution 
Input 1 Input 2 Total 
Prob. Cash Flow Prob. Cash Flow Prob. Cash Flow 
1/3 60 1/3 40 1/3 100 
1/3 80 1/3 50 1/3 130 
1/.l__ 105 _!./3 55 1/3 160 
y 1, t+1 = 81.67 y = 2,t+1 48.33 y = A,t+1 130 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
cov(Y 1,t+1, Mt+1) = 7,500 cov(Y2,t+1, Mt+1) = 2,500 cov(YA,t+1' Mt+1) = 10,000 
var(Mt+1) = 166,667 
A. = .0036 
v 1,t = 683.37 v 2,t = 491.63 
v 1,t + v 2,t = vA,t = 1,175 
Market Cash Flow 
Distribution 
Prob. Cash Flow 
1/3 500 
1/3 1,000 
1/3 1,500 
M = t+1 1,000 
Assume Xt = 5,000 
i = .08 
N 
l...r1 
Input 1 
Prob. Return 
1/3 
1/3 
lfl__ 
.0511 
.0681 
.0894 
.r1,t - .0695 
cov(r 1, t' rm) 
B1 .0013 
. 0067 
.0013 
.194 
B1 + 
TABLE II 
RETURN DISTRIBUTIONS: TWO-INPUT FIRM AND MARKET 
Firm A Return Distribution 
Input 2 
Prob. Return 
1/3 
1/3 
lfl__ 
.0340 
.0426 
.0468 
r2,t - .0411 
cov(r2 , r ) = .0004 
,t m 
B2 
.0004 
.0067 
B2 
.06 
Total 
Prob. Return 
1/3 .0851 
1/3 .1106 
]J]_ .1362 
r A, t = .1106 
cov(rA , r ) = .0017 
,t m 
SA .254 
Market Return 
Distribution 
Prob. Return 
1/3 .1 
1/3 .2 
1/3 .3 
-
r = . 2 
m 
var(r ) = .0067 
m 
B = .0017 = 254 
.0067 • 
N 
0'\ 
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TABLE III 
FIRM B INFORMATION 
Firm B Cash Flow Distribution Firm B Return Distribution 
Prob. Cash Flow Prob. Return 
1/3 
1/3 
1/3 
~ ~ 
cov(YB,t+1' Mt+1) 
vB,t 
400 
870 
1,340 
870 
~ 
1/3 
1/3 
lfl_ 
r = B,t 
~ 
156,667 cov(VB,t' VM) 
3,825 SB 
1,175 254 + 3,825 1.224 s 
5,000 • 5,000 
.06 + .94 = 1.00 
.1046 
.2275 
.3503 
.2275 
.0082 
1.224 
Case lA 
Case 2A 
Case 3A 
Case 4A 
Case SA 
Case 6A 
Case 7A 
TABLE IV 
DESCRIPTION OF SEVEN CASES INVOLVING SPECIFIC PRICE CHANGES 
Price Change 
Parameters 
kl = .00 
tl = .00 
kl = .20 
tl = .00 
kl = . 20 
tl = .20 
kl = .20 
t1 = .10 
k1 
t1 
k = 1 
t = 1 
.20 
.OS 
.10 
.1S 
k 1 = .OS 
t1 = .1S 
k2 = .00 
t2 = .00 
k2 = .20 
t2 = .00 
k2 = .20 
t2 = .20 
k2 = .10 
t2 = .00 
k2 
t2 
k = 2 t = 2 
k = 2 
t = 2 
.10 
.OS 
. OS 
.1S 
.10 
.1S 
Description 
This represents a world of no price changes. 
The firm experiences a .20 increase in both inputs, but cannot pass 
along any of this increase to consumers. 
The firm passes along the total price increase for both inputs to the 
consumers. 
Only half the increase in the first input's price is passed along to the 
consumer, while none of the second input's price increase is passed 
along to the consumer. This case can be viewed as the more general case 
for Cases 2A and 3A, whereby k - t = C for all e. 
e e 
This firm experiences different rates of input price increases but can 
only shift a portion of these increases to consumers. The portion 
passed along to consumers is equal for each input. (Note that k - t f-
e e C for all e.) 
This is the opposite of Case SA . While the firm incurs different input 
price increases, if shifts higher rates to consumers. The rates passed 
along to consumers are equal. 
This is exactly like Case 6A, except k and t are reversed for each 
. e e 1nput. 
Note: In all cases, no general price changes occur (i.e., g 0). 
N 
00 
r 
m 
Case 1A 
(g=O; k 1=0, k 2=0; .2 
t 1=0, t 2=0) 
Case 2A 
(g=O; k 1=.20, .2 
k 2=.20; t 1=0, 
t2= 0 
Case 3A 
(g=O;k1=.20, .2 
k2=.20; t1=.20, 
t2=.20) 
Case 4A 
(g=O; k 1=.2, .2 
k 2=.1; t 1=.10, 
t2=0) 
Case SA 
(g=O; k 1=.2, .2 
k2=.1; t 1=.05, 
t2=.05) 
Case 6A 
(g=O; k 1=.1, .2 
k2=.05; t 1=.15, 
t2=.15) 
Case 7A 
(g=O; k 1=.05, .2 
k2=.1; t 1=.15, 
t2= .15) 
TABLE V 
THE EFFECTS OF SPECIFIC PRICE CHANGES ON SYSTEMATIC RISK 
i ;>. 4>1 4>2 M v1 v2 V* a1 a2 
.08 .0036 1 1 1,0000 683.37 491.63 1,175.00 1 1 
.08 .0036 .333 .333 1,000 683.37 491.63 391.27 1 1 
.08 .0036 1 1 1,000 683.37 491.63 1,175.00 1 1 
.08 .0036 .667 .667 1,000 683.37 491.63 783.73 1 1 
.08 .0036 .so .833 1,000 683.37 491.63 751.21 • 782 1.303 
.08 .0036 1.167 1.333 1,000 683.37 491.63 1,452.84 .944 1.078 
.08 .0036 1.333 1.167 1,000 683.37 491.63 1,484.66 1.055 .924 
z 61* 
1 .194 
1 .194 
1 .194 
1 .194 
1 .152 
1 .183 
1 .205 
B * 2 
.06 
.06 
.06 
.06 
.078 
.065 
.06 
B* 
.254 
.254 
.254 
.254 
.230 
.248 
.265 
N 
1.0 
TABLE VI 
THE EFFECTS OF GENERAL AND SPECIFIC PRICE CHANGES ON SYSTEMATIC RISK 
r* i* 
""' 
<1>1 <1>2 M vr v~ V* a1 a2 z Sf m 
Case 1B 
(g=.10; k 1~o. .3 .18 .0024 1 1 1,000 353.72 235.17 588.89 2.00 2.00 1.50 .256 
k2=0; t 1=0, 
t2=0) 
Case 2B 
(g=.10; k1=.20, .3 .18 .0024 .333 .333 1,000 353.72 235.17 196.10 2.00 2.00 1.50 .256 
k 2=.20; t 1=0, 
t2=0) 
Case 3B 
(g=.10; k 1=.20, .3 .18 .0024 1 1 1,000 353.72 235.17 588.89 2.00 2.00 1.50 .256 
k2=.20; t1=.20, 
t2=.20) 
Case 4B 
(g=.10; k1=.2, .3 .18 .0024 .667 .667 1,000 353.72 235.17 392.79 2.00 2.00 1.50 .256 
k2=.1; t 1=.10, 
t2=0) 
Case 5B 
(g=.10; k1=· 2, .3 .18 .0024 .50 .833 . 1,000 ,353. 72 235.17 372.76 1,576 2,626 1.50 .204 
k 2=.10; t 1=.05, 
t2=.05) 
Case 6B 
(g=.10; k1=.1, .3 .18 .0024 1.167 1.33 1,000 353.72 235.17 726.27 1.888 2.157 1.50 .244 
k 2=.05; t 1=.15, 
t2=.15) 
Case 7B 
(g=.O; k1=.05, .18 .18 .0024 1.333 1.167 1,000 353.72 235.17 745.95 2.100 1.838 1.50 2. 72 
k2~.10; t 1=.15, 
t2=.15) 
S* 2 
.080 
.080 
.080 
.080 
.105 
.086 
.074 
S* 
.336 
.336 
.336 
.336 
.309 
.330 
.346 
w 
0 
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determine the relative impact of each price change of systematic risk. 
Cases 1A-7A represent the specific price and general price change 
scenarios. Each case is discussed below. 
Case lA presents a world in which there is no price change. Input 1 
and Input 2's portion of the total systematic risk of .254 is .194 and 
.06, respectively. The introduction of a general price increase of .10 
in Case lB, however, causes beta to increase to .336 (or 32 percent). 
Each input's portion of this total risk rises to .256 and .080. 
Cases 2A and 3A are simplifications of the more general Case 4A, 
which demonstrates that systematic risk is unaffected when the 
differences between the rate of input price increase (k ) and the 
e 
amount of this rate passed along to consumers (t ) are the same for each 
e 
input (that is, k - t 
e e 
C for all e). Case 2A shows a firm with price 
increases of .20 for each input, none of which is passed along to the 
consumer. Case 3A, on the other hand, shows a firm that shifts all of 
its .20 increase for each input to the consumer. Case 3A is a direct 
illustration of Corollary 1. Notice that beta in Cases 2B, 3B, and 4B 
are the same as Case lB. 
Case 5A illustrates the case in which a smaller percentage of the 
dominant input's price increase is passed along to the consumer, 
compared to the less dominant input (the dominant input is defined to 
be the input contributing the most to the firm's systematic risk). 
For example, only 25 percent of input l's price increase is passed 
along to the consumers as compared to 50 percent of inputs 2's price 
increase. It is interesting to note that input l's beta drops from 
.194 to .152, while input 2's beta increases to .079 from .06, resulting 
in an overall decrease in firm beta to .230. Similar results obtain 
from Case SB, whereby total beta falls from .336 to .309. 
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Cases 6A and 6B differ from Cases SA and SB in that more than the 
input price increases are passed along to consumers. Total beta 
decreases slightly in each of these cases (compared to Casea 1A and 1B). 
Note that 150 percent of the dominant input price increase is passed 
along to the consumer, while 300 percent of input 2's price increase is 
passed along to the consumer. Input 1's beta decreases, while input 2's 
beta increases. 
Cases 7A and 7B are identical to Cases 6A and 6B, except the amount 
of specific price increases are reversed for each input. Now, 200 
percent of input 1's price increase is passed along to the consumer, 
while only 150 percent of input 2's price increase is passed along to 
the consumer. As a result, input 1's beta increases and input 2's 
beta decreases. Cases 5A-7A and Cases 5B-7B demonstrate that specific 
price changes can affect a firm's systematic risk. Cases 1B-7B further 
demonstrate that general price changes can affect a firm's systematic 
risk. These cases are all consistent with Proposition 1. Cases 5A-7A, 
on the other hand, show that even when general price changes are zero, 
specific price information is still useful in assessing a firm's 
systematic risk. This was proven in Corollary 2. Finally, Corollary 1 
is illustrated by Cases 3A and 3B (which are related to Cases 2A, 2B, 
4A, and 4B), whereby a firm is not affected by specific price changes 
if it shifts the total price increase for each input to consumers. 
Implications from the Analysis 
The above cases more clearly illustrate the effects of price 
changes on systematic risk as developed in the second section. In 
addition, they serve as a basis on which to draw implications for 
accounting. For example, it was shown that a firm's systematic risk 
is affected by the rates of input price increases and the amount of 
these increases passed along to consumers. From the perspective of an 
investor, then, knowledge of this information would be helpful in 
assessing a firm's systematic risk. An accounting question stemming 
from this analysis includes whether ASR190 or FAS33 disclosures were 
helpful in estimating k or t • 
e e 
The disclosures required by ASR190 and FAS33 were discussed in 
Chapter I. Neither required information about t , the rates of input 
e 
price increases passed along to consumers. However, both required 
various types of information related to k , the rates of input price 
e 
increases. Specifically, both ASR190 and FAS33 required current cost 
disclosure of inventory, cost of goods sold, property, plant, and 
equipment, and depreciation. Additionally, FAS33 required disclosure 
of income from continuing operations calculated by deducting replace-
ment cost of goods sold and depreciation; also, it required disclosure 
of increases or decreases in current costs of inventory and property, 
p~ant, and equipment (otherwise known realized and unrealized holding 
gains). 
Based on the above disclosures, it appears that investors would be 
unable to obtain direct measures of k • For example, an investor 
e 
would not be able to determine each k for a firm with multiple 
e 
inventory inputs, since these inputs are aggregated in FAS33. 
Similarly, the realized and unrealized holding gains reported in 
FAS33 are lumped together for inventory and property, plant, and 
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equipment. Perhaps the inability to obtain a direct assessment of k 
e 
is one reason why past empirical studies have concluded negatively 
about the usefulness of ASR190 and FAS33 disclosures. 
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It appears that the required disclosures may provide some indirect, 
imperfect, information about k • The model developed in this chapter 
e 
showed that both k and t are essential to risk assessment. Since 
e e 
only part of the needed information about k is available, it is 
e 
doubtful that beta will change due to revelation of this information. 
Perhaps, however, the market has some access to information regarding 
t , and disclosure of information related to k may lead to a change 
e e 
in beta. This is an empirical question, and the implications of 
information about k are explored in this study. 
e 
The empirical segment of this study provides additional evidence 
regarding the usefulness of ASR190 and FAS33 disclosures. These tests, 
however, are based on a theory which shows that knowledge of k and t 
e e 
are useful in assessing systematic risk. Specifically, the first test 
addresses the question of whether the disclosures contained information 
which led investors to revise their assessments of k and t 
e e 
If so, 
then more beta changes may have occurred for disclosure firms than for 
non-disclosure firms. The second test, on the other hand, looks only 
at FAS33 disclosures. Firms reporting the largest differences between 
inflation-adjusted data and historical cost data were presumably 
affected the most by price changes. If disclosure of these large 
differences caused investors to revise their assessments of t and k , 
e e 
then more beta changes for these large-difference firms would be 
expected. 
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The price-change model developed in the second section also showed 
that general price changes affect systematic risk. Cases 1B-7B showed 
that systematic risk increased 32 percent when general prices changed 
from zero to 10 percent. The disclosures required by ASR190 did not 
include the effects of general price changes, while FAS33 disclosures 
did include them. It seems highly unlikely that these FAS33 disclosures 
contained any new information about general price changes, since this 
information is already available from several other sources (for example, 
the Consumer Price Index is released approximately the 20th of each 
1 
month). For this reason, it is not surprising that many previous 
tests on the usefulness of general price-change adjusted information 
have reached negative conclusions. An interesting test of the theory 
developed in this chapter, however, would be to compare measures of 
systematic risk in periods characterized by significantly different 
inflation rates. This question is addressed in the third empirical 
test conducted in this study. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to analytically explore the 
effects of specific and general price changes on systematic risk. In 
so doing, the effects of these price changes on firm value could also 
be examined. First, the CAPM, a model of firm value in a non-inflationary 
1The FASB, by eliminating historical cost/constant dollar infor-
mation, seems to indirectly concur with this. In explaining the 
basis for its conclusion, the FASB (1984, p. 3) stated that "the 
evidence has indicated that reporting effects of changing prices using 
two different methods may detract from the usefulness of the information 
and that the historical cost/constant dollar information is less useful 
than the current cost/constant purchasing power information." 
environment, was reviewed. Next, this model was expanded to include 
both specific and general price change parameters. It was shown that 
a firm's end-of-period cash net income is dependent on the specific 
rate of input price increase, and also on the percentage of this price 
increase which is passed along to consumers. In addition, it was also 
shown that firm value is dependent on general price changes. 
After analyzing the effects of price changes on a firm's end-of-
period cash net income and firm value, the next task was to identify 
the impact of these price changes on systematic risk. Proposition 1 
was then formally stated and proven. This proposition demonstrated 
that both types of price changes can affect systematic risk, and 
therefore this information can be useful for risk assessment. 
Two corollaries directly followed from Proposition 1. Corollary 1 
showed that a firm would not be affected by specific price changes if 
the firm passed along the entire price increase to the consumer. 
Corollary 3 indicated that specific price information is still useful 
in assessing a firm's systematic risk,· even when general inflation is 
zero. These results support the position that specific price 
disclosures may have value even when general inflation is not 
unusually high. 
Next, a numerical example was presented to better illustrate 
the effects of price changes on systematic risk. Several cases of 
differing price change scenarios were employed. From these cases, 
implications for accounting were discussed. The questions addressed 
by the three empirical tests in this study were included in this 
discussion. The next chapter presents the details and describes the 
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design and methodology of these tests, while Chapter IV provides an 
analysis of the results. 
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CHAPTER III 
EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the design of the 
empirical study and the means by which this design was accomplished. 
The prior chapter's developments showed that systematic risk is 
affected by specific and general price changes. In this chapter, 
three tests based on this development are performed. 
The first test addresses the question of whether the disclosures 
required by ASR190 and/or FAS33 allowed investors to obtain measures 
of k , one specific price change parameter shown to affect beta. The 
e 
second test is restricted to examining FAS33 disclosures. The third 
test, on the other hand, examines the effects of general price changes 
on systematic risk. 
The first section of this chapter explains how each test relates 
to the theoretical model and describes the questions each test 
addresses. The second section describes the overall sample selection 
process. The firms included in this overall sample make up the 
population of firms from which each test's sample is drawn. The 
third section includes an explanation of the statistical tests which 
are used to identify structural changes in a firm's systematic risk. 
The next three sections describe the design, methodology, and sample 
selection (from the overall sample) for each of the empirical tests. 
A final section consists of a brief summary. 
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Questions Suggested from the Analysis 
One question suggested by the prior chapter's development is: 
Were the disclosures required by ASR190 and/or FAS33 sufficient 
to allow investors to revise their assessments of the rates of input 
price increases (k )? 
e 
If ASR190 or FAS33 data were being used by investors to revise 
their measures of k , then more re-assessments of systematic risk 
e 
would be observed for firms reporting this data. Test 1 explores the 
effects of price change disclosures on systematic risk. The period 
January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1982, which covers the effective dates 
of ASR190 and FAS33 disclosures, is examined. An additional test 
similar to Test 3 (to be explained below) is also performed for certain 
firms in the Test 1 sample. Narrowing the focus to FAS33 disclosures 
only, the following question is asked: 
Were the disclosures required by FAS33 more informative for 
firms that were more affected by price changes? 
Test 2 addresses this question. Presumably, firms reporting the 
largest differences between inflation-adjusted and historial cost data 
were affected the most by price changes. Since the theory shows that 
beta can be affected by specific price changes, it is possible that 
these firms experienced more beta changes than lesser affected firms. 
While Test 1 and Test 2 deal with disclosure of specific price 
information, Test 3 involves general price changes. Since general 
price change information is readily available to the market, Test 3 
addresses a different question, namely: 
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Do firms experience more systematic risk changes in periods of 
high inflation than in periods of low inflation? 
The theory states that beta will change if general prices change. 
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Ideally, this theory could be tested if systematic risk was examined in 
a period with no general price changes and compared to a period with 
general price changes. Since no periods can be identified where general 
inflation is zero, Test 3 identifies three periods of differing price 
changes. These periods are classified as low, medium, and high, with 
the low period acting as a surrogate for a noninflationary period. If 
more risk changes occurred in the high period vis-a-vis the lower 
periods, then there is evidence supporting the theory that general 
price changes affect beta. Since the theory predicts that beta will 
change if g > 0, negative empirical results cannot be used to provide 
evidence against the theory itself (g > 0 occurs for all three periods). 
Overall Sample Selection 
An initial overall sample of 334 firms was selected for this study 
based on Test 1. Two groups of firms were identified: (1) test group 
and (2) control group. The test group consisted of firms subject to 
FAS33, while the control group consisted of those firms not subject to 
FAS33. To be included as a test firm, the following selection criteria 
had to be satisfied: 
1. Inclusion on the FASB Statement 33 DataBank tape, 
2. Inclusion on the Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
monthly tape, and 
3. Matched with a control firm satisfying (2) but not (1). 
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The FASB tape contains only information pertaining specifically to those 
firms required to report the mandated inflation disclosures. These 
firms include both financial and non-financial firms. 
The CRSP tape was needed in order to calculate betas and changes 
in betas. Beta calculations are based on Sharpe's (1963) market model, 
which specifies the following relationships: 
where 
a. + S .R + E. J J mt Jt 
E(E j t) 
cov(R , 
mt Ejt) 
cov(Ejt' Ekt) 
Rjt 
0, 
0, 
0, 
ex post return on security j, 
= ex post return on all other capital assets 
("market return") 
error term, and 
intercept and slope. 
R was computed using an equal-weighted index. 1 
mt 
The group of control firms, all of which were not required to 
disclose FAS33 data, was also selected from the CRSP tape and matched 
with the test firms based on the following two matching criteria: 
(i) systematic risk and (ii) industry. 
Criterion (i) required that each pair of test and control firms 
have similar risk measures before the reporting of inflation data 
1Brown and Warner (1980) showed that use of the value-weighted 
(16) 
index resulted in more Type I errors, vis-a-vis the equal-weighted index. 
Also, they found that the equal-weighted index was no less likely, and 
in fact slightly more likely, to pick up abnormal performance than the 
value-weighted index. 
required by ASR190. To achieve this, firms were matched on betas, plus 
or minus .10 percent, computed over the 18-month period July 1, 1974 to 
December 31, 1975. The purpose of criterion (ii) was to control for 
any effects on firm behavior specifically unique to a particular 
industry. Industry membership was determined by the three-digit 
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Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) number. Appendix A consists of 
a flowchart providing more detail on the selection process. 
Statistical Tests for Identifying Risk Changes 
A computer program called TIMVAR, written by Brown, Durbin, and 
Evans (1973), was used to identify structural changes in betas. 
Hansen (1977) employed this program to identify periods in which betas 
were stable and unstable. The following description of TIMVAR, as well 
as Appendix B, are adapted from his study. TIMVAR embodies a set of 
techniques for detecting departures from constancy of regression 
relationships over time when regression analysis is applied to time 
series data (Brown et al., 1973). More specifically, TIMVAR tests the 
hypothesis of constant regression coefficients over time, 
s = s T 
(8 is used here to represent a vector of regression coefficients) 
where the subscript t = 1, ... , Tis used to indicate that St may vary 
with time. 
There are three techniques used to identify structural changes in 
beta, and one technique used to detect when the change occurred. 
First, the above hypothesis can be investigated by constructing forward 
and backward plots of cumulative sums and sums of squares of recursive 
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residuals. These two tests, cusum and cusum of squares, involve a pair 
of significance lines, which if crossed by the sample path, results in 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of constant regression coefficients. 
The third technique is a homogeneity test based on analysis of 
variance. Coefficients are obtained by fitting the model to a segment 
of n successive observations and moving this segment along the time 
series. The final TIMVAR technique is the plotting of Quandt's log-
likelihood ratio which detects the single time point, if any, at which 
there is an abrupt change from one constant set of parameters to 
another (Quandt, 1958). A more detailed description of TIMVAR is given 
in Appendix B. 
The TIMVAR program provided the results of the above tests and 
performed standard regression. Examination of the data using these 
techniques enabled identification of firms experiencing beta changes, 
provided a count of the number of risk changes for these firms, and 
pinpointed when the change(s) occurred. 
In all three empirical tests, .10 was used as the critical value 
for alpha. Seven primary TIMVAR tests were run on each firm, as 
shown in Table VII. As Brown et al. (1973) mentioned, it should not 
be a cause for concern if the tests did not give identical results. 
Departures from constancy may have shown themselves in different ways, 
and the tests may not have been equally powerful against the particular 
departure encountered. The cusum of squares test, for example, is 
sensitive to residual variance changes, and significant results may 
have been obtained for this test when the cusum test did not. 
Therefore, a firm was determined to have a beta change if any of 
the cusum tests or homogeneity tests were significant. If only one or 
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TABLE VII 
TESTS USED TO DETECT STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN BETA 
Primary TIMVAR Tests 
Critical Value 
a= .10 
1. Cusum- Forward 
2. Cusum - Backward 
3. Cusum of Squares - Forward 
4. Cusum of Squares - Backward 
5. Homogeneity - Moving Regression Length 12 
6. Homogeneity - Moving Regression Length 24 
7. Homogeneity- Moving Regression Length 36 
Secondary Test' for Equality of Variance** 
0.850 
0.850 
0.17215* 
0.17215* 
1.650* 
1.650* 
1.760* 
Critical Value 
Secondary Test a = .05 
1. n = 12, r = 7 
2. n = 24, r = 3 
3. n = 36, r = 2 
* 
6.75 
2.81 
2.00 
These critical values are illustrative of the case with 84 
observations (12 x 7 years), as in Empirical Test 1. The values differ 
depending on the number of observations. 
** This test was performed if one or both of the cusum of squares 
test was significant, and all other tests were not significant. 
both of the cusum of squares tests was significant, then a secondary 
test was performed because of the sensitivity to residual variance 
factor described above. This test, called the Hartley test, tests for 
equality of variances when sample sizes are all equal (Neter and 
Wasserman, 1974). The hypothesis was: 
H · Not all a2 are equal. 1 . j 
2 The largest sample variance, denoted max(s.), and the smallest sample 
J 
variance, denoted min(s~), were used to obtain the following test 
J 
statistic: 
H min(s~) 
J 
Clearly, values of H near 1 supported H0 , and large values of H 
supported H1 . The distribution of H when H0 held was tabulated and 
critical values were compared to this table to determine the level of 
significance. The distribution of H depended on the number of factor 
levels, r, and the sample size, n, and assumed a normal population. 2 
Since three moving regressions were performed for each firm, three 
values of H were computed. H0 was not rejected and a beta change 
was judged to have occurred if at least two of these values were less 
than their respective table values. 
2 A factor level r depends on the length of the moving regression 
and the number of observations in each regression. For example, with 
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a moving regression of length 12 (i.e., n=12) and 84 total observations, 
there are seven factor levels, corresponding to regressions computed 
over observations 1-12, 13-24, 25-36, 37-48, 49-60, 61-72, and 73-84. 
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Test 1 
The objective of this test was to determine if evidence of 
significant risk assessment changes occurred in the presence of mandated 
inflation disclosures. The analytical model constructed in Chapter II 
showed that specific and general price changes had an effect on 
systematic risk. If disclosure of such information caused investors 
to revise their risk assessments, then this would indicate that such 
data had information value. One way to test this would be to compare 
the number of risk changes of firms required to make these disclosures 
with the number of risk changes of firms not required to do so. As 
Chapter I indicated, only the very largest corporations were subjected 
to ASR190 and FAS33. Therefore, a "control" set of firms for a test 
such as the one described above necessarily consists of smaller firms. 
From the 167 pairs of matched firms initially identified, 87 pairs 
3 
were kept for Test 1. Notice that the numbers in the column, "ID No.", 
were preceded by either a "T" or "C". This denotes whether the firm is 
a test or control firm. For example, Firm No. 1 and Firm No. 58 are 
identified as test and control match No. 41. These two firms are 
classified under SIC industry 3540 (Machine tools, metal cutting types). 
TIMVAR was run for the period January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1982 for 
all 174 firms. 
The process of identifying and classifying beta changes merits 
explanation. Figure 1 illustrates the procedure for identifying if ·and 
3Return data for the period 1969-1975 was originally calculated for 
all 334 firms with the intent of performing an alternative test. Since 
several firms did not have the necessary return data for this time period, 
they were eliminated, along with their related matches. This reduced 
sample of 87 firms was considered adequate to accomplish the desired 
objective of the test. 
Classify as 
"Beta Change" 
Go 
to 
A 
Subperiod 1 
Run TIMVAR 
for 
1976-1982 
yes 
Run TIMVAR for 
Two Subperiods 
Go to B 
no -0-- Classify as 
_ A -"No Beta 
Change" 
Subperiod 2 
Figure 1. Procedure for Identifying Structural Changes in Beta 
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when a structural change occurred. The result of the process described 
in Figure 1 was a firm identified as either a "no beta change" or a 
"beta change" firm. If a change was detected, the period was divided 
into two segments, and TIMVAR was re-run over these two subperiods in 
order to detect additional beta changes. Finally, the total number of 
beta changes was counted. 
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Consideration was given to controlling for beta changes that 
corresponded to the occurrence of significant events, as reported in The 
Wall Street Journal Index (1976-1982), by eliminating those beta changes. 
Not eliminating beta changes due to major events, however, recognizes 
the possibility that some firms may engage in risk changing activities 
because of specific and general price changes. For example, a firm 
may issue more debt to buy assets now in order to avoid future specific 
price increases. By doing so, it would also perhaps be able to repay 
this debt with cheaper dollars, if prices continue to rise. If many 
of the beta changes corresponding to major events of this nature, then 
controlling for these events may have a confounding effect (in other 
words, the event corresponding to the beta change may have been 
caused, or partially caused, by inflation). For this reason, beta 
changes corresponding to major events were not eliminated. 
For each of the 174 firms, the dates of beta change were noted, 
and categoried into the following subperiods: (1) ASR190 subperiod, 
from 1/1/76 to 12/31/78, and (2) FAS33 subperiod, from 1/1/79 to 
12/31/82. In order to determine whether disclosures required by 
ASR190 and FAS33 were being used by investors to obtain more accurate 
assessments of specific price changes, two statistical tests were used. 
For the first test it was hypothesized that the proportion of ASR190 
and FAS33 firms experiencing changes in beta was greater than the 
proportion of firms not required to report this data. The second test 
was a test of differences in beta changes experienced by test firms as 
compared to their matched control firms. This test covered the entire 
seven year period. 
An additional test similar to Test 3 was performed for some of the 
firms in this sample. TIMVAR was used over the period January 1, 1966 
to December 31, 1972, for the firms with available return data. This 
reduced the number of matched pairs to 43. Since the period 1976-1982 
experienced a much higher inflation rate than 1966-1972 (see Test 3), 
the possibility exists that the beta changes noted in 1976-1982 may 
have been caused by general inflation. Therefore, it was hypothesized 
that the number of beta changes for the 86 firms during the 1976-1982 
period was greater than the number of beta changes for the 86 firms 
during the 1966-1972 period. A test of differences for paired samples 
was employed. 
Test 2 
The objective of Test 2 was similar to Test 1, except attention 
was restricted to the usefulness of FAS33 disclosures in assessing the 
effects of specific and general price changes on a firm's systematic 
risk. It seems reasonable to surmise that firms with the largest 
differences between reported historial cost disclosures and inflation-
adjusted disclosures were most affected by changing prices. Since it 
was shown that beta can be affected by specific and general price 
changes, then it is possible that these firms experienced more beta 
changes than lesser affected firms. The purpose of Test 3, therefore, 
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so 
was to examine firms required to report FAS33 data, and determine if 
firms with wide disparities in historical cost and inflation-adjusted 
measures experienced more beta changes .than less disparate firms. 
Sample Selection and Test Procedure 
The original sample of 167 test firms was reduced to 83 firms 
4 because of data availability reasons. These 83 firms are listed in 
Appendix D. The time period for this test was January 1, 1979 to 
December 31, 1981. The procedure to identify beta changes was similar 
to Test 1. 
Details of the required disclosures of FAS33 were outlined in 
Chapter I, and Figure 2 provides an example of the form of these 
supplementary disclosures. Notice that six numbers are circled. Items 
1, 2, and 4 represent net income from continuing operations (IFCO) under 
three methods: historical cost income from continuing operations 
(HCIFCO), general inflation-adjusted income from continuing operations 
(CDIFCO), and specific price-change adjusted income from continuing 
operations (CCIFCO). The purchasing power gain and loss is represented 
(PPGL) by items 3 and 5, while the holding gain (HG), net of increase 
in prices attributable to general inflation, is represented by item 6. 
The FASB (1979, pp. 56-57) believed that presenting alternative 
measurements was desirable, since "a single measure may be insufficient 
to convey all the effects of changing prices on a business enterprise." 
4Most of the 84 firms dropped from the original sample elected 
to report only 1980 and 1981 current cost data, as allowed by FAS33. 
The remaining firms were financial firms, and were not listed on the 
Compustat Industrial Files. 
SPECIFICATION OF VARIOUS ACCOUNTING INCOME MEASURES TO BE USED IN THIS STUDY 
STATEMENT OF INCO}ffi FROM CONTINUING OPERATIONS ADJUSTED FOR CHANGING PRICES 
For the Year Ended December 31, 1980 
(In {OOOs) of Dollars) 
Net sales and other operating revenues 
Cost of goods sold 
Depreciation and amortization expense 
Other operating expense 
Interest expense 
Provision for income tax 
Income (loss) from continuing operations 
Gain from decline in purchasing power of 
net amounts owed 
Increase in specific prices {current cost) 
of inventories and property, plant, and 
equipment held during the year* 
Effect of increase in general price level 
Excess of increase in specific prices over 
increase in the general price level 
As Reported in the 
Primarv Statements 
$253,000 
197,000 
10,000 
20,835 
7,165 
9,000 
244,000 
$ 9,000 1 
Adjusted for 
General 
Inflation 
$253,000 
204,384 
14,130 
20,835 
7,165 
9,000 
255,514 
$ (2,514) 2 
$ 7. 729 3 
Adjusted for Changes 
in Specific Prices 
(Current Costs) 
$253,000 
205,408 
19,500 
20,835 
7,165 
9,000 
261. 908 
$ (8,908) 4 
1____z_,_z295 
$ 24,608 
8,959 
$ 5,6496 
*At December 31, 1980 current cost of inventory was $65,700 and current cost of property, plant, 
and equipment, net of accumulated depreciation was $85,100. 
Adapted from FASB, Appendix A, 1979. 
Figure 2. Illustration of Supplementary Disclosure Form of FAS33 
Vl 
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Therefore, six alternative measures were used for Test 3. These 
measures are defined as: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
CDA = CDIFCO = Item 2 
CDB = CDIFCO + PPGL = Item 2 + Item 3 
CCA CCIFCO = Item 4 
4. CCB CCIFCO + PPGL = Item 4 + Item 5 
5. CCC = CCIFCO + HG = Item 4 + Item 6 
6. CCD = CCIFCO + PPGL + HG Item 4 + Item 5 + Item 6 
Earnings data were obtained from two sources: (1) Standard and 
Poors Compustat Annual Industrial Files, for historical cost earnings, 
and (2) FASB Statement 33 DataBank tape, for inflation-adjusted 
earnings numbers. By using six measures, one may perhaps obtain 
some insight into which earnings numbers were being used more exten-
sively by investors. 
Each of the six measures above was subtracted from HCIFCO. It was 
hypothesized that firms with the largest differences would experience 
a higher number of risk changes, if the disclosures allowed investors 
to more effectively measure the impact of changing prices on these 
firms. 
Test 3 
The example presented in Chapter II' consisted of seven cases, with 
each case examined in a-non-inflationary and an inflationary world. In 
this example, it was shown that systematic risk increased 32 percent 
when general prices changed from zero to 10 percent. If general price 
changes have a similar effect on firms in the real world, it seems 
possible that a period experiencing a great deal of inflation would 
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experience more risk changes than a less inflationary period. Table VIII 
presents the GNP Implicit Price Deflator for the period 1957-1982. This 
period was divided into three subperiods, each characterized by different 
inflation rates: (1) 1958-1964 (low), (2) 1966-1972 (medium), and 
(3) 1976-1982 (high). As one can see from the table, the GNP Implicit 
Price Deflator for the low subperiod increased at an average annual 
rate of 1.64 percent, with low and high rates of .92 percent and 2.36 
percent. In the medium subperiod the annual average inflation rate 
was 4.33 percent, with low and high rates of 3.0 percent and 5.37 
percent. Lastly, the high subperiod showed an average inflation rate 
of 6.02 percent, with low and high rates of 4.36 and 10.16 percent. 
The objective of Test 3 was to determine if more risk changes 
occurred in higher inflationary periods vis-a-vis lower inflationary 
periods. A total of 117 firms, listed in Appendix D, had the necessary 
return data with which to identify beta changes. TIMVAR was initially 
run over all three subperiods for each firm. 
It was hypothesized that there were more beta changes in the 
period with higher inflation. To test this, two types of statistical 
information sets were obtained. The first information set consisted 
of the same proportions test of firms experiencing beta changes as in 
Test 1, while the second information set consisted of a test of 
differences in the number of beta changes experienced by each firm 
across the three subperiods. Details of these information sets, along 
with results of the tests, are included in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the empirical design and methodology 
TABLE VIII 
GNP IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATOR, 1957-1982 
Low Inflationary Period Medium Inflationary Period High Inflationary Period 
Year Index % Increase Year Index % Increase Year Index % Increase 
----------------------------------------------(1972 = 100)-----------------------------------------------
1957 64.93 3.45 1966 76.76 3.23 
1958 66.04 1. 71 1967 79.06 3.00 
1959 67.60 2.36 1968 82.54 4.40 
1960 68.70 1.63 1969 86.79 5.15 
1961 69.33 .92 1970 91.45 5.37 
1962 70.61 1.85 1971 96.01 4.99 
1963 71.67 1.50 1972 100.00 4.16 
1964 72.77 1.53 1973 105.75 5.75 
1965 74.3 7 2.18 1974 115.08 8.82 
Average Increase Average Increase 
1958-1964 = 1.64% 1966-1972 = 4.33% 
Note: Years within brackets make up the period under study. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1983). 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
128.99 
134.99 
143.24 
155.38 
168.05 
185.13 
201.22 
210.80 
Average Increase 
1976-1982 = 6.02% 
12.08 
4.65 
6.11 
8.15 
10.16 
8.69 
4.36 
6.02 
U1 
+:--
of the three empirical tests used to test the effects of price change 
disclosures, as well as the price changes themselves, on investors' 
assessments of systematic risk. These tests were based on the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter II, which showed that specific 
and general price changes affect systematic risk. The first section 
of this chapter explained how each test relates to the model and 
described the questions each test addresses. 
The samples used in all three tests were drawn from an overall 
sample of 334 firms. Also, all three tests used TIMVAR, a set of 
statistical tests to identify structural changes in systematic risk. 
The second and third sections of this chapter described the sample 
selection process and explained the tests included in TIMVAR. 
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The next three sections described the details of each of the 
empirical tests. Test 1 explored the effect of price change disclosures 
on systematic risk (as well as providing a test similar to Test 3). 
Whereas Test 1 addressed both ASR190 and FAS33 disclosures, Test 2 
focused only on FAS33 disclosures. Test 3 examined the effect of 
price changes in three periods characterized by significantly different 
inflation rates. The next chapter provides the results of these tests. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
This chapter presents an analysis of the results of the empirical 
tests outlined in Chapter III. Test 1 consists of a primary test and 
a secondary test. The primary test examines the information value of 
specific price change disclosures required by ASR190 and FAS33, while 
the secondary test looks at the effects of general price changes as well. 
Test 2 is restricted to testing for the information value of FAS33 
disclosures only. Test 3, on the other hand, is a test to determine if 
the predicted effects of general price changes are observed in the three 
periods characterized by different rates of price change. Four sections 
are presented in this chapter: one section for the results of each of 
the three tests, and a final section containing a discussion of the 
overall results of these tests. 
Results of Test 1 
Test of Specific Price Change Disclosures 
Two statistical tests examining the usefulness of ASR190 and FAS33 
disclosures were conducted on the 174 firms (87 matches) listed in 
Appendix C. Note that the number of beta changes for the period 
January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1982, are listed for each firm. For 
the first test, this period was divided into an ASR190 subperiod and 
an FAS33 subperiod. Looking first at ASR190, it was hypothesized that 
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more ASR190 firms experienced one or more beta changes than the control 
firms, if the information value of these disclosures enabled users to 
more accurately measure the effects of specific price changes on 
systematic risk. Let: 
N 
Define 
number of test firms experiencing a beta change in the 
ASR190 period, 
number of control firms experiencing a beta change in 
the ASR190 period, and 
total number of matched firms (that is, 87). 
The hypothesis tested was: 
If ASR190 had a significant effect, H0 should be rejected. 
(18) 
(19) 
The test statistic used is one which tests for differences between 
two population proportions (Daniel and Terrell, 1975, p. 177): 
z = 
p (1 - p )]~ c c 
nc 
(20) 
where the samples are independent simple random samples, z is normally 
distributed, and 
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the true population proportion, pT and Pc 
pT and Pc estimates of pT and Pc based on sample sizes nT and n • 
c 
A test of the FAS33 subperiod was performed in a similar manner. 
Statistical results for both subperiods are presented in Table IX. 
Notice that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for either subperiod, 
which indicates that the number of disclosure firms experiencing beta 
changes is not significantly different from the number of non-disclosure 
firms. 
TABLE IX 
STATISTICAL RESULTS OF PROPORTIONS TEST: TEST 1 
ASR190 FAS33 
Statistic Subperiod Subperiod 
nT 20 37 
nc 17 39 
N 87 87 
PT 23.0% 42.5% 
Pc 19.5% 44.8% 
z 
calc 0.563 -0.036 
ztable, .10 1.28 1.28 a= 
Conclusion Do Not Reject H0 Do Not Reject H0 
To obtain additional evidence, a second statistical test was 
employed, comparing the differences between the number of beta changes 
incurred by each test and control pair over the entire seven-year 
period. The hypothesis tested was: 
where ~T and ~C are the population number of beta changes experienced 
by test and control firms. Let: 
D. 
]_ 
the difference between test firm i's number of beta changes 
and control firm i's number of beta changes. 
The differences D. in the individual pairs are assumed to be normally 
]_ 
distributed about a mean ~D' which represents the average difference in 
the effects of the two treatments over the population of which these 
pairs are a sample. The test statistic is: 
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t (21) 
where 
s-D 
(22) 
The test statistic follows Student's t-distribution with n-1 degrees of 
freedom, where n is the number of pairs (Snedecor and Cochran, 1980). 
Results of this test were similar to the proportions test. 
Specifically: 
D -0.057 
sD = 1.2138 
t = -0.047 
t bl 10 1.29 ta e, a = • 
The hypothesis that the number of beta changes experienced by test 
firms is significantly different than the number of beta changes 
experienced by control firms cannot be rejected. 
Test Incorporating General Price Changes 
Table VIII in Chapter III showed that average inflation was 6.02 
percent and 4.33 percent over the periods 1976-1982 and 1967-1973, 
respectively. The question addressed in this test is whether the 
number of beta changes in the 76-82 period was higher than the 67-73 
period. The model developed in Chapter II indicated that beta is 
affected by general price changes. 
The 87 matched firms in Appendix C were reduced to 43 matches 
because of availability of return data. The number of beta changes 
for each of the 43 firms was identified and listed in Appendix C. 
If the rate of inflation in the 76-82 period was different enough to 
significantly affect the general price change parameters, then more 
beta changes may be observed for both test and control firms. 
Figure 3 serves as a basis on which to explain the hypotheses 
examined. The first-hypothesis is: 
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where ~H is the true number of beta changes in the 76-82 period (high) 
and ~Lis the true number of beta changes in the 67-73 period (low). 
Test Firms 
Control Firms 
LOW 
(1967-1973) 
~TL 
n = 43 
~CL 
n = 43 
HIGH 
(1976-1982) 
~TH 
n = 43 
~CH 
n = 43 
Hypotheses Tested: 
1. H1: ~ = ~1 
2. Hz: ~TH ~TL 
3. H3: ~CH ~CL 
Figure 3. Hypotheses Tested in Test 1: 
Examination of the Effects 
of General Price Change 
This test can be divided into two subtests, where the test and 
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control firms are analyzed separately. For the test firms, Hypothesis 2 
is stated as: 
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where the subscripts indicate test (T) firms in the high (H) and low (L) 
periods. Hypothesis 3 is identical to Hypothesis 2, except control (C) 
firms are examined. If Hypothesis 2 yields significant results and 
Hypothesis 3 does not, ASR190 and FAS33 disclosures could explain the 
difference, since only test firms were subject to these disclosures. 
The same test of differences between paired samples described earlier 
is used for all three hypotheses in this test. 
Results of these tests are presented in Table 10. In all three 
cases the null hypothesis was not rejected. Implications from these 
results are discussed after the results of Test 2 and Test 3 are 
presented. 
Hypothesis 
H1 
Hz 
H3 
TABLE X 
STATISTICAL RESULTS OF TEST 1: INCLUSION OF THE 
EFFECTS OF GENERAL PRICE CHANGES 
n D s-D t calc t table,a=.10 
86 .198 1.176 .168 1.29 Do 
43 .186 1.277 .146 1.30 Do 
43 .209 1.094 .191 1.30 Do 
Results of Test 2 
Conclusion 
not reject 
not reject 
not reject 
Test 2 narrows the focus of testing for the usefulness of mandated 
disclosures to the 83 firms subject to FAS33 listed in Appendix D. 
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TIMVAR was used to identify beta changes over the period January 1, 1979 
to December 31, 1981. Then, for each of the six inflation-adjusted 
earnings measures, the following steps were taken: 
1. The inflation-adjusted measure was subtracted from the 
historical cost measure. 
2. The absolute value of each difference was calculated and 
ranked according to size. 
3. A schedule of 28 firms with the largest differences was 
prepared (representing one-third of the 83 firms in the sample). 
4. A list of the firms identified as "beta change" firms was 
compared to this schedule, and a count of firms appearing on both 
was taken. 
Since the effects of specific and general price changes were 
presumably more dramatic for the "large difference" firms, then it 
is hypothesized that these firms will experience a proportionally 
higher number of risk changes than a random selection of firms. For 
example, a random sample of 30 firms drawn from the 83 firms should 
be expected to contain 10 firms (28/83 = x/30; x = 10) that were 
included in the schedule of 28 "large difference" firms. If the 30 
firms are not random, however, but contain useful information about 
specific and general price changes, then more than 10 firms would be 
expected to be in the 28-firm schedule. 
Table XI lists the 24 firms identified as beta change firms 
(these firms are also denoted with an'*' in Appendix D). Random 
selection of any 24 firms should result in inclusion of eight firms 
in the schedule of 28 "large difference" firms. Note that only one 
of the inflation-adjusted measures, CCD, meets this expected value. 
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TABLE XI 
TEST 2 RESULTS 
Rank, Based on Inflation-Adjusted 
Appendix D Less Historical Cost Earnings 
Firm No. CDA CDB CCA CCB CCC CCD 
2 
5 28 4 7 11 
6 25 
15 
23 1 1 1 1 4 2 
24 
25 
27 21 
28 9 21 20 16 
29 
30 
33 27 23 27 
35 
39 3 6 4 1 1 
46 
49 15 14 21 
50 
55 26 25 
57 21 19 12 19 
66 
68 20 3 11 4 14 5 
69 
74 
75 
Number of Firms 
Appearing of 
Both Schedules 6 7 6 6 6 6 
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The results of this test, like Test 1, provide no evidence that FAS33 
disclosures had a significant impact of systematic risk of firms 
subject to these disclosures. 
Results of Test 3 
Appendix E contains a list of the 117 firms included in this test, 
along with the number of beta changes experienced by each firm during 
the low, medium, and high inflationary periods identified in Chapter III. 
As in Test 1, a proportions test and a test of differences between 
paired samples was used to test whether more beta changes occurred in 
periods of higher inflation. First, for the proportions test, let: 
~ 
~ 
Define 
number of firms experiencing a beta change in the low 
inflationary period (1958-1964)' 
number of firms experiencing a beta change in the medium 
inflationary period (1966-1972)' 
= number of firms experiencing a beta change in the high 
inflationary period (1976-1982), and 
total number of firms (that is, 151) . 
The three hypotheses tested were: 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
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2. vs. 
If the firms in the higher inflationary periods experienced a signifi-
cantly greater number of beta changes than in the lower inflationary 
periods, H0 should be rejected. The test statistic is the same 
z-statistic used in Test 1 to test for differences between two population 
proportions. Table XII gives the results for this test. It is obvious 
that H0 cannot be rejected in all cases. 
A test of differences between paired samples was also performed. 
For each firm, the difference between the number of beta changes 
experienced in each period was computed. Let: 
the average difference between the number of beta changes 
experienced by firms in the high and low inflationary 
periods. 
Similarly, DH-M and DM-L are defined for the other periods. The 
hypotheses tested were similar to the proportions test, except the 
mean number of beta changes was examined rather than the number of 
firms experiencing one or more beta changes. Table XIII presents the 
results of this test, and once again it is noted that none of the null 
hypotheses can be rejected. 
Comparative Discussion of the Overall Results 
All three empirical tests failed to provide evidence that price 
change, or price change disclosures, has an impact on systematic risk. 
The following discussion provides an explanation of why this may have 
occurred. First, with respect to the tests of specific price 
disclosures in Test 1 and Test 2, it is'very possible that the 
Statistic 
2 calc 
z table,a=.10 
Conclusion 
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TABLE XII 
STATISTICAL RESULTS OF PROPORTIONS TEST: TEST 3 
Hypothesis 1: Hypothesis 2: Hypothesis 3: 
High vs. Low High vs. Medium Medium vs. Low 
53 54 
53 53 
54 54 
117 117 117 
.453 .453 
.453 .453 
.462 .462 
.138 .138 .000 
1.280 1.280 1.280 
Do Not Reject Do Not Reject Do Not Reject 
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disclosures required by ASR190 and FAS33 were not sufficient to allow 
investors to revise their risk assessments. It was shown that 
knowledge of each input's price change, and the amount of this price 
change passed along to consumers, is required. It appears highly likely 
that neither ASR190 nor FAS33 provided this information, and therefore 
it is not surprising that these tests, as well as the majority of 
empirical tests conducted in prior studies, reached negative conclusions 
about the usefulness of these disclosures. Test 2's somewhat anomalous 
results are difficult to rationalize. The fact that less than one-third 
of the beta change firms were included in all but one of the ranked 
schedules is hard to explain. Ex post rationalization leads one to 
wonder if less specific price change information (if indeed there was 
any information at all) was inferred from firms reporting the largest 
differences between historical cost and inflation-adjusted measures. 
Perhaps the existence of such wide disparities caused investors to shy 
away from re-assessing the risk of a firm whose inflation-adjusted 
measures deviated so drastically from traditional historical cost. 
TABLE XIII 
STATISTICAL RESULTS OF TEST OF DIFFERENCES: TEST 3 
Hypothesis NT D s-D t calc ttable,a=.10 Conclusion 
H1 (H vs. L) 117 .0513 1.238 0.04 1.66 Do not reject 
H2 (H vs. M) 117 .1111 1.165 0.01 1.66 Do not reject 
H3 (M vs. L) 117 -.0598 1.101 -0.05 1.66 Do not reject 
The test of beta changes performed in Test 3, as well as the 
secondary test in Test 1, failed to provide any evidence of more beta 
changes in periods of higher inflation. This conclusion is also not 
surprising, in light of the fact that the extent of inflation's effect 
on risk is not known. While the numerical example supporting the 
theoretical model in Chapter II showed that beta increased when general 
inflation increased from zero to 10 percent, this example may not be 
externally valid. The example assumed the existence of a period of 
no general price changes. Test 3 attempted to use a low inflationary 
period as a surrogate for a non-inflationary period, but it may not 
have been an acceptable one. It is possible that different rates of 
inflation may not affect the frequency of structural changes in beta, 
or that the time periods used in the tests may not have been sophisti-
cated enough to capture different inflation rates. 
The fact that the tests in this study, as well as a majority of 
tests performed in prior studies, do not support FAS33 may suggest that 
the information currently being disclosed in not what should be 
disclosed. The theoretical model developed in this study indicates 
that each input's specific price increase and the amount of this 
increase passed to consumers is necessary in assessing a firm's 
systematic riak. The fact that this theoretical model drove the 
empirical tests may well be the major contribution of this study. 
Hopefully, future empirical studies may rely on this model, or one 
such as this. The next chapter, Chapter V, concludes this dissertation 
with a summary of the findings and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter I, the introductory chapter, presented the objective of 
this study. It described the inflation disclosures currently being 
required by FAS33, as well as those required by ASR190. The FASB and 
SEC had hoped that these disclosures would be useful to users at both 
an individual firm level and a macroeconomic level. As a result, 
several studies were performed to determine if the objectives of 
ASR190 and FAS33 were being met. 
One area of research which has attracted much interest is the 
potential effect these disclosures may have had on the capital market. 
Chapter I classified these studies as information content studies or 
systematic risk prediction studies. It was pointed out that both 
categories relied on an estimate of the systematic risk component 
(beta) of an individual security relative to the market return. None 
of these studies, however, considered the effect that inflation, or 
inflation disclosures, might have on beta itself. One reason for this 
is that no theory existed which linked the effects of inflation to 
systematic risk. Several researchers have recognized the need for such 
a theory (for example, Lev and Ohlson, 1983; Revsine, 1970). They 
contended that empirical tests would be more fruitful if a theoretical 
foundation was developed first. 
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A major objective of this research, therefore, was to provide a 
theory which demonstrated the effect of specific and general price 
changes on systematic risk. After developing this theory, three 
empirical tests predicated on this theory were performed. The first and 
second tests dealt with the effect of price change disclosures on 
systematic risk, while the third test explored the effect of general 
price changes on systematic risk. 
Summary of the Findings of the Study 
Theoretical Examination of Inflation's 
Effect on Systematic Risk 
Chapter II analytically incorporated specific and general price 
change parameters into a non-inflationary model of firm value. This 
model of firm value was derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), which shows that the only firm specific determinant of a firm's 
return is its systematic risk. In order to incorporate price change 
variables into the model, six assumptions were made. It was shown 
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that firm value in an inflationary environment is affected by (1) the 
amount of each input's specific rate of price change, (2) the amount of 
each input's price change passed along to consumers, and (3) general price 
changes. Proposition 1 showed that specific and general price changes 
can also affect systematic risk. Thus, disclosure of this information 
can be useful for risk assessment. 
In addition to Proposition 1, two corollaries were presented. 
Corollary 1 indicated that a sufficient condition for systematic risk 
to be unaffected by specific price changes was for the firm to pass 
along total specific input price increases to the consumer. Corollary 2 
showed that disclosure of specific price information is still useful 
in assessing a firm's systematic risk even when general prices are 
unchanged. 
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These two corollaries yielded interesting implications. Firms that 
can more easily pass along input price increases to consumers should 
experience less risk volatility due to price changes than firms less 
able to do so, according to Corollary 1. Corollary 2, on the other hand, 
indicated that specific price disclosures may be useful even when 
general inflation is negligible. This is encouraging in light of the 
fact that historical cost/constant dollar information has so recently 
been eliminated. Also, this finding may have important implications 
for future policy, in that certain current cost information may be 
useful even without inflation. The FASB might consider this when it 
considers potential modification of the current cost disclosures now 
required. 
Empirical Examination of the Effect of 
Inflation and Inflation Disclosures 
on Systematic Risk 
Chapter III described the design of the three empirical tests 
conducted in this study, while Chapter IV presented an analysis of 
the results of these tests. All three tests were based on the 
theoretical model which showed that systematic risk can be affected 
by specific and general price changes. 
The objective of Test 1 was to determine if evidence of significant 
risk assessment changes occurred in the presence of ASR190 and FAS33 
disclosures. If these disclosures allowed investors to more accurately 
assess the impact of price changes on systematic risk, then more risk 
changes should be observed for these firms vis-a-vis non-reporting 
firms. A sample of 87 matched pairs of firms was selected. Each pair, 
consisting of a reporting and non-reporting firm, was subjected to a 
set of statistical tests of nonstationarity to identify significant 
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beta changes. It was hypothesized that firms reporting inflation 
disclosures would undergo more risk changes than those not required to 
report these disclosures. Results indicated no evidence that disclosure 
of ASR190 or FAS33 data affected the betas of disclosure firms more 
than the betas of non-disclosure firms. 
The second test was restricted to examination of FAS33 disclosures 
only. Differences between inflation-adjusted earnings measures and 
historical cost earnings measures were computed and ranked for a sample 
of 83 firms. It was hypothesized that firms with the largest differences 
would experience more beta changes, since the effects of specific and 
general price changes were more dramatic for these firms. The findings 
of this test were similar to Test 1, in that no evidence was provided 
supporting the hypothesis that FAS33 disclosures had a significant 
impact on systematic risk. 
The third test involved selecting three time periods with 
significantly different inflation rates. The objective of this test 
was to determine if more changes in systematic risk occurred in a period 
in which specific and general price changes were more pronounced. 
Significant beta changes were identified for a sample of 117 firms 
for each time period. Results of the two statistical tests performed 
indicated no evidence that firms were affected more dramatically in 
higher inflationary periods. 
Summarizing, none of the three empirical tests provided evidence 
that price change disclosures or price change itself impacted 
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systematic risk. Potential explanations for these results were discussed 
at the end of Chapter IV. One reason is that ASR190 or FAS33 disclosures 
may not have been sufficient to allow investors to revise their risk 
assessments. If this is the case, then it is not surprising that a 
majority of past empirical studies reached negative conclusions about 
the usefulness of these disclosures. Another reason for the negative 
results is that the extent of the impact of price changes on systematic 
risk is not known. 
Limitations of the Study 
The findings of this study are necessarily dependent on capital 
market theory. The CAPM is a single period model, and whether or not 
it is sufficiently rich to answer questions about the role of accounting 
data, a multiperiod phenomenem, is not clear. Even so, the CAPM has 
been widely accepted as a model on which real-world implications for 
accounting and security analysis .can be drawn. 
Another limitation of this study is the potential restrictiveness 
of the six assumptions used to incorporate specific and general price 
changes into the model. The assumption of two inputs made the analysis 
much less complex, and adding additional inputs would not affect the 
results. The assumption that output price equals input cost plus a 
fixed percentage of input cost, however, may not hold for firms within 
industries characterized by strong competition. The pricing strategies 
of competitors may have a greater effect on output price than input 
cost. Assumptions 3, 4, and 5 do not appear to be very restrictive. 
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For Assumptions 3 and 4, the effects of inflation are simply added to the 
expected market rate of return and risk-free interest rate in the 
absence of inflation (Fisher effect). For Assumption 5, the end-of-
period market cash flow is increased by general inflation. Finally, 
the last assumption, which stipulates that the firm experiences a 
specific rate of input price increase and passes along a portion of 
this increase to the consumer, is not at all restrictive. 
The example presented in Chapter II shows that specific and general 
price changes have a significant effect on risk. This example, however, 
included a market with only two firms. A third limitation, perhaps, is 
that the real-world effects on systematic risk may not be significant 
(future research could attempt to identify these real-world effects--
see the following section). Hence, the empirical tests would yield 
insignificant results even if the theoretically correct price change 
information was being disclosed. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
There are several areas of possible research in this area, some 
of which stem from this study's limitations. First, as mentioned in 
the limitations section, the CAPM is a single period model. It would 
be interesting to see how the price change parameters included in 
this study would be incorporated into richer, multiperiod models. 
Another area of possible research includes identification of 
firms with differing abilities to pass along input price increases 
to consumers (this relates to the third limitation above). Corollary 2 
indicated that the systematic risk of firms that could more readily 
pass along input price increases to consumers should be less affected 
by price changes. Results of such a test could aid in assessing the 
validity of the model developed in this study. 
This study reviewed systematic risk prediction studies, which 
examined the relationship between accounting risk measures (ARMs) and 
systematic risk. Most of these ARMs were not, however, theoretically 
linked to risk. Although this dissertation does not specifically 
address the relationship between various ARMs and risk, it does yield 
some insight as to how specific and general price changes affect beta. 
Therefore, future studies examining this relationship might well be 
advised at least to attempt to incorporate price change effects into 
the ARMs. If the data being disclosed is not sufficient to obtain 
accurate price-change adjusted ARMs, then an argument can be made 
calling for such information, if it exists. 
TIMVAR, the set of statistical tests used to identify structural 
changes in beta, was used in this study. Perhaps the association 
between several of the ARMs and systematic risk can better be explored 
empirically by using TIMVAR. For example, dividend payout has been 
used as an ARM in most of these studies, but its relationship to beta 
is not very certain. If changes in dividend payout correspond to 
changes in risk, as identified by TIMVAR, then more confidence could 
be placed in the validity of using this ARM in the risk prediction 
model. Also, by adjusting these ARMs for the effects of price changes, 
more powerful conclusions could perhaps be reached. 
In any case, the above suggestions support the contention that a 
theoretical foundation should be constructed first in order to lend 
credence to future empirical tests. Irrespective of the results of 
the empirical tests in this study, it is hoped that this dissertation 
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has contributed to the theoretical base that has thus far been so 
seriously lacking in the inflation accounting area. 
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APPENDIX A 
FLOWCHART--SAMPLE SELECTION 
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Test Firm Source 
Eliminate 
Non-NYSE 
Firms 
Yes 
Eliminate 
firms with 
more than six 
missing 
observations 
Figure 4. 
Control Firm Source 
liminate 
ore than six 
missing 
observations 
Calculate 
beta for the 
period 
7/1/74 to 
12/31/75 
Potential Test Firms 
Potential 
Flowchart--Sample Selection 
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APPENDIX B 
NONSTATIONARITY TESTS 
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The description of the TIMVAR tests is based on the paper written 
by Brown et al. (1973). The basic regression model in this study is: 
t 1, ... , T, 
where Yt is the observation of the dependent variable at time t and 
Xt is the observation of the independent variable at time t. The 
error terms, Ut' are assumed to be independent and normally distributed 
with means'of zero and variances, Vart' t = 1, ..• , T. The hypothesis 
of constancy over time is investigated by four tests--cusum test, cusum 
of squares test, homogeneity tests of moving regressions and Quandt's 
log-likelihood ratio test. This hypothesis is formally expressed as: 
H: C:) = (::) = •• .(~) • 
Cusum Test 
The cusum test is based upon the use of recursive residuals. 
Recursive residuals are standardized residuals which are calculated 
by inserting X in the regression equation calculated from the first 
t-1 observations, and then subtracting this predicted value from the 
actual value, Yt. That is, assuming HO to be true, let ar_1 and St_1 . 
be the OLS estimates obtained from the first r-1 observations. The 
forward recursive residual is thus defined as: 
w 
r 
A 
[Y -(a. 1 + r r-
r = 3, •.. , T. 
A [1 + 1 I r + (X - X 2)] ~ 
S X)] I r 
r-1 E(X. - X2) 
1 
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Under H0 it can be shown that wk+1, ... , wr are independent, 
N(O, Var) (where k = number of regressors). If the coefficients alpha 
and beta are constant up to a certain point and then change, thew 's 
r 
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will have zero means up to the disturbance point and non-zero thereafter. 
The cusum test examines plots of the cusum quantity, 
w = (1/S) 
r 
r 
E 
k+1 
w., 
J 
r = 3, .•• , T 
against r for r = k+1, ••• , T, where Sis the estimate of the standard 
deviation of the residuals using all T observations. 
Since thew 's are N(O, Var) theW 's are approximately normal 
r r 
such that: 
E(W ) = 0, Var(W ) = r-2, and Covar(W , W ) = min(r,s) - 2. 
r r r s 
Next, a pair of symmetrical lines, above and below, the mean value line 
E(W ) 
r 
0 are constructed such that the probability of the sample path 
crossing one of the lines is alpha, the level of significance. The 
method of construction is based upon known results in Brownian motion 
theory. A backward recursion process is also performed to assist in 
locating the disturbance point. Critical values for alpha = .01, .05, 
and .1 are, respectively, 1.143, .948, .85 (these critical values 
apply, of course, to the cusum test). If a computed W is greater than 
the critical value selected, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Cusum of Squares Test 
The cusum of squares test is based upon the squared recursive 
residuals and examines the plot of the quantities: 
s 
r 
r 
( L: 
k+1 
2 T 
w. ) I ( z:: 
J k+1 
2 
w. ) 
J 
r = 3, ••• , T 
The test is more sensitive to haphazard changes in coefficients than is 
the cusum test. It is also sensitive to changes in the residual 
variance. Under H0 , sr can be shown to have a beta distribution with 
mean (r-2)/(T-2). A pair of lines, (r-2)/(T-2) plus or minus c0 , 1 are 
drawn parallel to the mean value line such that the probability that 
the sample path of s crosses a line is alpha. 
Homogeneity Tests 
Another means for investigating beta instability is the use of 
moving regressions. A regression is fit on a short segment of n obser-
vations which is then moved along the series. That is, for T 
observations, regressions are fit on the segments, (1, n), (2, n+1), 
•.. , (T-n-1, T). A significance test for constancy of regression 
coefficients, the homogeneity test, is utilized. It is based on the 
use of regressions on nonoverlapping time segments using analysis of 
variance. The nonoverlapping time segments for a moving regression 
of length n, are (1, n), (n+1, 2n), ... , [(p-1)n+1, T]. where pis the 
integral part of T/N. The homogeneity statistic for b nonoverlapping 
segments is: 
F [
(SSET -
[(T-2p)/(2p-2)] 
SSE 1 - SSE 2 
b 
( l: SSE.) 
1 l 
where SSET is the residual sum of squares for the regression on the 
1For the derivation of c0 , see Brown et al. (1973), pp. 154-155. 
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entire T observations and SSE., i = 1, ••. , b is the residual sum of 
1 
squares for the regression on each of the nonoverlapping segments. 
Quandt's Log-Likelihood Test 
This test is used to detect the point in time in which the 
regression relationship changed from one constant relationship to 
another constant relationship. Quandt (1958) describes the development 
of the techniques. For each r from r = 3 to T - 3 the ratio Q 
r 
log 10 [(max likelihood of observations given H0)/(max likelihood of 
observations given H1)] is computed, where H1 is the hypothesis that 
observations in the time segments (1, •.. , r) and (r+l, ... , T) come 
89 
from two different regressions. The minimum value of Q is the estimate 
r 
of the point at which the switch from one relationship to another has 
occurred. It can be shown that 2 2 Qr = (r log s1)/2 + ((T-r)/2)log s2 -
2 2 2 (T log S )/2, where s1 , s2 , and s2 are the residual sum of squares 
divided by the number of observations in each of the subintervals and 
the entire interval, respectively. 
APPENDIX C 
LIST OF TEST 1 FIRMS 
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Number of Beta 
Changes 
SIC 1966- 1976-
Firm No. ID No. 1972 1982 
1 Acme Cleveland Corp 3540 T 41 2 0 
2 Air Prods & Chems Inc 2810 T 14 0 0 
3 Alagasco Inc 4920 T 72 0 0 
4 Alberto Culver Co 2844 c 22 0 
5 Allegheny Intl Inc 3310 c 35 1 2 
6 Allied Corp 2810 c 14 1 0 
7 American Home Prods Corp 2830 T 13 1 0 
8 American Sterilizer Co 3842 c 46 0 
9 Ameron Inc 3272 c 28 1 
10 Amp Inc 3690 T 52 1 0 
11 Amrep Corp 6552 c 84 2 
12 Amsted Inds Inc 3310 c 30 1 
13 Apache Corp 1311 T 4 2 
14 Arkla Inc 1321 T 5 1 
15 Aro Corp 3580 c 47 0 2 
16 Arvin Inds Inc 3710 T 54 1 0 
17 Axia Corp 3310 c 34 0 0 
18 Ball Corp 3221 c 26 1 
19 Baxter Travenol Labs Inc 2830 c 19 0 1 
20 Belco Petroleum 1310 T 2 1 
21 Bethlehem Steel 3310 T 30 0 
22 Black & Decker Mfg Co 3540 T 42 2 
23 Bristol Myers Co 2630 T 19 0 0 
24 Brockway Inc 3221 T 26 0 
25 Brush Wellman Inc 3359 T 37 1 
26 CCX Inc 3310 c 31 0 
27 CPC ~ntl Inc 2040 c 9 0 1 
28 CP Natl Corp 4931 T 76 2 
29 CTS Corp 3660 T 50 0 
30 Campbell Soup Co 2030 c 7 0 0 
31 Carolina Fght Carrier 4213 c 62 0 
32 Carpenter Technology Corp 3310 T 34 1 0 
33 Carter Wallace Inc 2830 c 18 1 0 
34 Cascade Nat Gas Corp 4923 c 75 0 
35 Castle & Cooke Inc 2033 c 8 2 1 
36 Central Ill Lt Co 4930 T 78 1 
37 Cessna Aircraft Co 3720 c 57 0 0 
38 Champion Spark Plug Co 3690 T 53 1 0 
39 Chrysler Corp 3710 T 55 0 1 
40 Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co 1000 T 1 1 1 
41 Colgate Palmolive 2840 T 21 2 
42 Columbia Gas Sys Inc 4930 c 76 2 
43 Commonwealth Energy System 4931 c 77 2 
44 Conagra Inc 2041 T 10 1 
45 Consolidated Freightways Inc 4213 T 62 0 
46 Cooper Inds Inc 3510 c 39 0 1 
47 Cooper Labs Inc 2834 c 20 0 
48 Dana Corp 3710 c 54 1 1 
49 Deltona Corp 6552 T 84 o· 
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Number of Beta 
Changes 
SIC 1966- 1976-
Firm No. ID No. 1972 1982 
50 Digital Equip Corp 3573 T 46 0 
51 De Sotp Inc 2850 T 23 0 2 
52 Easco Corp 3310 c 58 1 0 
53 Eastman Kodak Co 3830 T 60 1 
54 Edison Bros Stores Inc 5660 T 81 0 0 
55 Empire Inc 5984 c 82 3 
56 Enserch Corp 4920 T 74 0 3 
57 Equifax Inc 7392 c 85 1 
58 Ex Cell 0 Corp 3540 c 41 0 1 
59 Fairchild Inds Inc 3720 T 57 0 2 
60 Federal Paper Brd Inc 2640 c 12 0 0 
61 Fleet Finl Group Inc 6025 c 83 1 
62 Flexi Van Corp 7394 T 85 0 
63 General Mis Inc C 15 2040 c 11 0 
64 General Signal Corp 3660 c 51 1 0 
65 Genstar Corp 3241 c 27 2 
66 Gerber Prods Co 2030 T 7 1 0 
67 Gleason Wks 3541 T 43 1 
68 Global Marine Inc 1381 c 6 2 
69 Golden West Finl Corp Del 6711 T 86 2 
70 Gould Inc 3690 c 53 1 0 
71 Great Atlantic and Pac Tea Inc 5510 c 80 0 2 
72 Gulf Res & Chern Corp 3332 Cl37 0 
73 Harris Corp Del 3550 T 44 2 
74 Harsco Corp 3310 T 29 0 
75 Harte Hanks Communications Inc 2711 c 13 0 
76 Hawaiian Elec Inc 4911 T 67 0 0 
77 Helmerich & Payne Inc 1311 c 3 1 1 
78 Hercules Inc 2890 T 24 0 0 
79 Hesston Corp 3523 T 40 0 
80 Hoover Unvl Inc 3560 c 56 0 0 
81 Houston Inds Inc 4910 T 65 1 0 
82 Houston Hat Gas Crop 4923 T 75 1 
83 ~unt Philip A Chern Corp 3861 c 60 1 
84 I C Inds Inc 6711 c 86 0 
85 I U Intl Corp 4920 c 72 0 0 
86 Illinois Pwr Co 4910 c 64 0 0 
87 Indianapolis Pwr & Lt Co 4910 T 68 1 2 
88 Inland Stl Corp 3310 c 32 0 
89 Interlake Inc 3310 T 31 1 
90 International Harvester Co 3520 c 30 0 
91 International Multifoods Corp 2041 T 11 1 
92 International Tel & Teleg Corp 3660 T 51 1 1 
93 Interstate Pwr Co 4910 c 65 0 0 
94 Iowa Elec Lt & Pwr Co 4910 c 66 1 2 
95 Iowa Pub Svc Co 4811 c 69 0 0 
96 Keystone Cons Inds Inc 3310 T 32 2 
97 Knight Ridder Newspapers Inc 2711 T 13 0 
98 Kroger Co 5410 T 79 1 
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Number of Beta 
Changes 
SIC 1966- 1976-
Firm No. ID No. 1972 1982 
99 L T V Corp 3720 T 59 0 0 
100 Lilly Eli & Co 2834 T 15 0 
101 Lockheed Corp 3720 c 59 1 1 
102 Lone Star Inds Inc 3240 T 27 0 
193 Louisiana Ld and Expl Co 1311 c 2 2 
104 Lukens Inc 3310 T 35 1 0 
105 Magic Chef Inc 3631 T 49 1 
106 Mapco Inc 4925 c 5 0 
107 Marion Labs Inc 2834 c 17 2 
108 McDonnell Douglas Corp 3720 T 59 2 0 
109 Michigan Energy Resources Co 4924 T 73 0 2 
110 Midland Ross Corp 3710 T 56 0 2 
111 Minnesota Mng & Mfg Co 2640 T 12 0 0 
112 Monarch Machine Tool Co 3540 c 42 0 
113 Morton Thiokol Inc 2830 c 15 0 
114 NCR Corp 2842 c 21 2 
115 NBD Bancorp Inc 6025 T 83 2 
116 N L Inds Inc 2850 c 23 0 2 
117 National Gypsum Co 3270 T 28 1 
118 National Std Co 3310 T 33 0 0 
119 National Std Corp 3310 T 36 0 1 
120 Natomas Co 1000 c 1 0 1 
121 Nevada Pwr Co 4911 T 64 2 1 
122 Niagara Mohawk Pwr Corp 4910 c 67 0 2 
123 Northeast Utils 4911 T 70 1 
124 Northern Ind Pub Svc Co 4911 c 71 1 0 
125 Oklahoma Gas & Elec Co 4910 T 71 0 1 
126 Oneida Ltd 3914 T 61 1 
127 Oneok Inc 4920 c 73 0 2 
128 Orange and Rockland Utils Inc 4930 T 77 0 
129 Outboard Marine Inc 3510 .T 39 0 3 
130 Overnite Transn Co 4214 T 63 2 
131 Pacific Ltg Corp 4920 T 87 0 0 
132 Pacific Pwr & Lt Co 4911 c 70 1 
133 Parker Hannifin Corp 3429 T 38 0 0 
134 Pepsico Inc 5410 c 79 2 
135 Pfizer Inc 2830 T 20 0 
136 Pillsbury Co 2040 c 10 1 
137 Portee Inc 3310 c 33 2 2 
138 Procter & Gamble Co 2840 T 22 1 2 
139 Proler Intl Corp 3341 c 29 2 
140 Public Svc Co N Mex 4931 c 78 0 
141 Purolator Inc 3714 c 55 2 1 
142 Quanex Corp 3317 c 36 1 1 
143 Ralston Purina Co 2040 T 9 0 2 
144 Reece Corp 3636 C494 1 
145 Ronson Corp 3910 c 61 2 1 
146 Safeway Stores Inc 5410 T 80 1 1 
94 
Number of Beta 
Changes 
SIC 1966- 1976-
Firm No. ID No. 1972 1982 
147 Schlumberger Ltd 3570 T 45 1 
148 Scoa Inds Inc 5661 c 81 0 1 
149 Scott & Fetzer Co 3635 c 48 2 
150 Sedco Inc 1351 T 6 0 
151 South Carolina Elec & Gas Co 4910 c 68 0 0 
152 Southern Ind Gas & Elec Co 4910 T 69 0 0 
153 Starrett L S Co 3420 c 38 0 1 
154 Sterling Drug Inc 2830 T 16 0 
155 Stokely Van Camp Inc 2030 T 8 2 0 
156 Stride Rite Corp 3140 c 25 1 1 
157 Suburban Propane Gas Corp 5980 T 85 1 
158 Sun Chem Corp 2850 c 24 0 3 
159 Sunstrand Corp 3540 c 43 1 
160 Superior Oil Co 1310 T 3 0 2 
161 Teco Energy Inc 4911 T 66 0 1 
162 Teledyne Inc 3602 c 44 1 
163 Tenneco Inc 4920 c 74 0 0 
164 Texas Oil & Gas Corp 1311 c 4 0 
165 Thomas & Betts Corp 3644 c 52 1 0 
166 Transcon Inc Cal 4213 c 63 2 
167 Tyco Labs Inc 3679 c so 0 
168 U M C Inds Inc 3580 T 47 1 0 
169 United Sts Shoe Corp 3140 T 25 0 0 
170 Univar Corp 2833 c 16 2 
171 Warner Lambert Co 2830 T 17 2 
172 Westcoast Transmission Ltd 4923 c 87 0 0 
173 Whirlpool Corp 3630 T 48 2 
174 Zapata Corp 1381 c 45 1 
APPENDIX D 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Firm Name 
ACF Inds Inc 
AMF Inc 
Abbott Labs 
Amerada Hess Corp 
American Home Prods 
Amp Inc 
Arkla Inc 
8 Armco Inc 
9 Arvin Inds Inc 
10 Bethlehem Steel Corp 
11 Borg Warner Corp 
12 Brockway Inc 
13 Brush Wellman Inc 
14 CP Natl Corp 
15 Certainteed Corp 
16 Chrysler Corp 
Corp 
17 Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co 
18 Colgate Palmolive 
19 .Dun & Bradstreet 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
* 
Eaton Corp 
Edison Bros Stores Inc 
El Paso Co 
Exxon Corp 
Fairchild Inds Inc 
Federal Mogul Corp 
Figgie Intl Inc 
Fruehauf Corp 
GATX Corp 
Grumman Corp 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc 
Harsco Corp 
Hawaiian Elec Inc 
Hercules Inc 
Hershey Foods Corp 
Hesston Corp 
Houston Inds Inc 
Ideal Basic Inds Inc 
Indianapolis Pwr & Lt Co 
International Tel & Teleg Corp 
Johnson & Johnson 
Kaiser Cement Corp 
Knight Ridder Newspaper Inc 
Koppers Inc 
Kroger Co 
L T V Corp 
Indicates that this firm experienced a beta 
change during 1/1/79 to 12/31/81. 
SIC 
No. 
3740 
3550* 
2830 
2910 
2830* 
3690* 
1321 
3310 
3710 
3310 
3710 
3221 
3359 
4931 
2990* 
3710 
1000 
2840 
7392 
3710 
5660 
4920 
2910* 
3720* 
3560* 
3569 
3710* 
3740* 
3720* 
2710* 
3310 
4911 
2890* 
2070 
3523* 
4910 
3240 
4910 
3660* 
3840 
3240 
2711 
2810 
5410 
3720 
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Firm Name 
46 Lone Star Inds Inc 
47 Longs Drug Stores Inc 
48 Lukens Inc 
49 McDonnell Douglas Co.rp 
50 McGraw Hill Co 
51 Midland Ross Corp 
52 Motorola Inc 
53 Murphy G C & Co 
54 N C R Corp 
55 National Distillers & Chm Corp 
56 National Gypsum Co 
57 National Stl Corp 
58 Nevada Pwr Co 
59 Northeast Utils 
60 Occidental Pete Corp 
61 Oklahoma Gas & Elec Co 
62 Orange & Rockland Utils Inc 
63 Pacific Ltg Corp 
64 Panhandle Eastn Corp 
65 Pfizer Inc 
66 Revere Copper & Brass Co 
67 Safeway Stores Inc 
68 Schlumberger Ltd 
69 Scovill Inc 
70 Smith A 0 Corp 
71 Southern Ind Gas & Elec Co 
72 Standard Oil Co Ind 
73 Sterling Drug Inc 
74 Stop & Shop Cos Inc 
75 Supermarkets Gen Corp 
76 Sybron Crop 
77 Teco Energy Inc 
78 T R W Inc 
79 U M C Inds Inc 
80 Warner Lambert Co 
81 Washington Gas Lt Co 
82 Weis Mkts Inc 
83 Whirlpool Corp 
SIC 
No. 
3240* 
5912 
3310 
3720* 
2710* 
3710 
3660 
5330 
3570 
2080* 
3270 
3310* 
4911 
4911 
1311 
4910 
4930 
4920 
4922 
2830 
3350* 
5410 
3570* 
3350* 
3710 
4910 
2910 
2830 
5411* 
5411* 
3840 
4911 
3710 
3580 
2830 
4920 
5411 
3630 
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LIST OF TEST 3 FIRMS 
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99 
Number of Beta Chan~es 
1958- 1966- 1976-
Firm Number and Name 1964 1972 1982 
1 ACF Inds Inc 2 0 0 
2 AMF Inc 1 1 1 
3 Abbott Labs 0 2 0 
4 Acme Cleveland Corp 1 2 0 
5 Alagasco Inc 2 0 0 
6 Allegheny Intl Inc 1 1 2 
7 Allied Corp 1 1 0 
8 American Home Prods Corp 0 1 0 
9 Amsted Inds Inc 0 1 1 
10 Armco Inc 0 1 2 
11 Arvin Inds Inc 1 1 0 
12 Axia Corp 0 0 0 
13 Bendix Corp 1 0 0 
14 Bethlehem Steel Corp 0 1 0 
15 Black & Decker Mfg Co 0 0 2 
16 Borg Warner Corp 2 0 0 
17 Bristol Myers Co 0 0 0 
18 Brooklyn Union Gas Co 2 0 0 
19 CCX Inc 1 1 0 
20 CPC Intl Inc 1 0 1 
21 Campbell Soup Co 1 0 0 
22 Carling Okeefe Ltd 0 0 0 
23 Carolina Fght Carrier Corp 0 0 0 
24 Carpenter Technology Corp 0 1 0 
25 Carter Wallace Inc 2 1 0 
26 Colgate Palmolive 2 l 2 
27 Columbia Gas Sys Inc 0 0 2 
28 Cooper Inds Inc 1 0 1 
29 Dana Corp 2 1 1 
30 De Soto Inc 0 0 2 
31 Disney Walt Prodtns Inc 0 1 0 
32 Easco Corp 0 1 0 
33 Eastman Kodak Co 2 0 1 
34 Eaton Corp 0 0 0 
35 Edison Bros Stores Inc 1 0 0 
36 El Paso Co 0 1 0 
37 Enserch Corp 1 0 3 
38 Ex Cell 0 Corp 0 0 1 
39 Exxon Corp 1 0 0 
40 Fairchild Inds Inc 0 0 2 
41 Federal Mogul Corp 0 1 1 
42 Federal Paper Brd Inc 2 0 0 
43 General Instr Corp 1 1 1 
44 General Mls Inc C 15 0 0 0 
45 General Signal Corp 1 1 0 
46 Gerber Prods Co 1 1 0 
47 Gould Inc 0 1 0 
48 Grumman Corp 0 0 0 
49 Harris Corp Del 0 0 1 
100 
Number of Beta Changes 
958- 1966- 1976-
Firm Number and Name 964 1972 1982 
50 Harsco Corp 1 0 0 
51 Hayes Albion Corp 2 0 2 
52 Heinz H J Co 1 0 0 
53 Hercules Inc 1 0 0 
54 Hershey Foods Corp 1 0 0 
55 Homestake Mining Co 0 2 1 
56 Houston Inds Inc 0 1 0 
57 I U Intl Corp 0 0 0 
58 Indianapolis Pwr & Lt Co 0 1 2 
59 Inland Stl Corp 0 1 0 
60 Insilco Corp 1 0 0 
61 Interlake Inc 0 2 1 
62 International Harvester Co 0 0 1 
63 International Tel & Teleg Corp 0 1 1 
64 Interstate Pwr Co 0 0 0 
65 Jewel Cos Inc 0 2 0 
66 Johnson & Johnson 0 2 1 
67 Keystone Cons Inds Inc 0 0 2 
68 Koppers Inc 2 1 0 
69 Kroger Co 0 2 1 
70 L T V Corp 1 0 0 
71 Lockheed Corp 0 2 0 
72 Lone Star Inds Inc 0 0 0 
73 Lukens Inc 2 1 0 
74 McGraw Hill Co 1 0 0 
75 Midland Ross Corp 1 0 2 
76 Minnesota Mng & Mfg Co 1 0 0 
77 Monarch Mach Tool Co 0 1 0 
78 Morton Thiokol Inc 0 0 0 
79 Motorola Inc 2 0 0 
80 Murphy G C & Co 2 1 1 
81 N C R Corp 2 1 2 
82 N L Inds Inc 0 0 2 
83 National Distillers & Chm Corp 0 0 2 
84 National Gypsum Co 0 1 1 
85 National Stl Corp 0 0 1 
86 Natomas Co 1 0 1 
87 Niagara Mohawk Pwr Corp 0 0 2 
88 Oklahoma Gas & Elec Co 0 0 1 
89 Oneok Inc 1 0 1 
90 Outboard Marine Inc 0 0 3 
91 Pacific Lrg Corp 0 0 0 
92 Pepsico Inc 0 0 2 
93 Pfizer Inc 2 2 0 
94 Pillsbury Co 0 1 1 
95 Portee Inc 1 2 2 
96 Procter & Gamble Co 1 1 2 
101 
Number of Beta Changes 
1958- 1966- 1976-
Firm Number and Name 1964 1972 1982 
97 Revere Copper & Brass Co 0 3 0 
98 Rexnord Inc 1 0 0 
99 Reynolds Metals Co 0 0 1 
100 Ronson Corp 1 0 0 
101 Safeway Stores Inc 0 1 1 
102 Schlumberger Ltd 0 2 1 
103 Scovill Inc 3 1 0 
104 Smith A 0 Corp 2 1 1 
105 South Carolina Elec & Gas Co 0 0 0 
106 Southern Ind Gas & Elec Co 0 0 0 
107 Standard Oil Co Ind 2 1 0 
108 Starrett L S Co 0 0 1 
109 Sterling Drug Inc 0 1 0 
110 Stokely Van Camp Inc 0 1 0 
111 Sun Chern Corp 0 0 3 
112 Sunstrand Corp 0 2 1 
113 Superior Oil Co 0 0 2 
114 Sybron Corp 1 0 1 
115 United Sts Shoe Corp 2 0 0 
116 Warner Lambert Co 2 1 2 
117 Whirlpool Corp 0 0 2 
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